War and the Army

Between the restoration of the state in 1185 and the fall of Tarnovo in 1393, records identify 76 interstate wars fought on Bulgarian territory and more than 250 battles. At least 38 conflicts conducted by autonomous regional lords and 23 palace coups, some of which developed into civil wars, must be added to them. These figures are incomplete. Most information comes from Byzantine, Latin, Hungarian, Serbian, Arabic, Ottoman, and Bulgarian chronicles, which chiefly follow campaigns to the south, southwest, and northwest. Events along the vulnerable northeastern frontier are documented far less thoroughly.

Even rulers remembered for peaceful government could not avoid war altogether. The first decade of Ivan Asen II's reign was relatively quiet, but it was followed by eight conflicts. By contrast, the reign of Theodore Svetoslav is associated with only one war against Byzantium and a limited clash with the Genoese; he also temporarily removed the Tatar pressure on Bulgaria. This stood in sharp contrast to the kingdom's early decades. Under Peter, Asen, and Kaloyan, war was principally connected with liberation and the consolidation of the state, whereas Boril fought both Bulgaria's neighbours and his domestic opponents. His prolonged struggle with Ivan Asen II probably amounted to a civil war.

The constant danger resulted partly from the geographical position of the Bulgarian lands. Routes linking Central Europe, the Straits, the steppes north of the Danube, and the eastern Mediterranean passed through them. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Pechenegs, Uzes, and Cumans repeatedly crossed the river and devastated the northeastern regions. Mongol attacks began in the 1240s. Contemporaries associated the invaders with the end of the world and called them “Tartars,” deriving their name from Tartarus, or hell. Accounts of them emphasize the killing of inhabitants, the destruction of settlements, and the ruin of herds and crops. One Byzantine author believed that these horrors should be described “with tears, not letters.”

Crusading armies passed in the opposite direction, usually along the great road from Belgrade to Constantinople. The expedition of 1189–1190 left parts of Thrace devastated, while the Fourth Crusade ended not in the Holy Land but with the capture of the Byzantine capital in 1204. Ottoman attacks began in the 1330s. Unlike many earlier invaders, the Ottomans sought not only booty but lasting conquest. Later accusations that John Kantakouzenos, Ivan Alexander, and Stefan Dušan simply missed an opportunity to halt the invasion oversimplify the situation. The Balkans were divided among dozens of autonomous powers whose mutual wars prevented concerted action.

The most enduring rivalry was that with Byzantium. The imperial political tradition regarded the Bulgarian lands as territory that had only temporarily been lost, while Bulgarian rulers treated them as their own inheritance. The uprising of 1185 was hastened by an additional tax imposed for the wedding of Emperor Isaac II Angelos, but its deeper cause was the desire to throw off Byzantine rule. Niketas Choniates emphasizes the confidence that Bulgarians drew from the mountainous landscape and the numerous fortresses along Haemus, the Balkan Mountains. This suggests that imperial supremacy in some regions was more formal than real.

The wars of the first Asen rulers were marked by severe retaliation. In Tarnovo, the consecration of the Church of St Demetrius of Thessaloniki was accompanied by a call to armed struggle, and Byzantine accounts claim that captives were to receive no quarter. After Kaloyan took Varna, he ordered captured defenders to be thrown into the fortress ditch and buried. Following the betrayal of Byzantine notables in Thrace, he destroyed Plovdiv and killed part of its aristocracy. Ivanko also became notorious for cruelty towards captured Byzantines. Most of these reports come from hostile Byzantine writers and contain rhetorical exaggeration, but they reflect a genuine logic of reciprocal vengeance. Kaloyan presented his actions as retribution for the violence of Basil II and therefore adopted the epithet “Roman-slayer.”

Ivan Asen II's victory at Klokotnitsa in 1230 demonstrated a different way of exploiting military success. The ruler released most of the captured common soldiers, making it easier for many towns and fortresses of the Epirote state to submit voluntarily. From this time, chronicles describe clearer rules for treating the defeated: nobles might be held for ransom or political purposes, but ordinary prisoners were to be released, while civilians might be plundered without necessarily being killed or enslaved. These norms did not eliminate suffering and should not be treated as a guarantee that was always honoured. They nevertheless reveal an attempt to restrict warfare between Christian states through recognized customs.

The rules broke down during especially bitter conflicts. When Michael VIII Palaiologos attempted to place Ivan Asen III on the Bulgarian throne, Ivaylo and his peasant army showed no mercy to captured Byzantines. Fear of capture further demoralized the imperial soldiers. In 1332, Andronikos III likewise violated established restraints by burning farmland and even grain lying on the threshing floors. Ottoman attacks brought an even sharper change. Bulgarian and Byzantine texts summarize their actions with formulas such as “killed, enslaved, and plundered,” while fortresses taken by assault were often followed by the massacre of defenders and the enslavement of women and children. The unexpected severity of this violence also gave the invaders a psychological advantage.

The northwestern frontier was another permanent theatre of war. Bulgaria and Hungary disputed control primarily of Belgrade, Braničevo, and later Vidin. Kaloyan temporarily drove back the Hungarian forces, but Boril surrendered the contested lands in return for assistance in suppressing a revolt. Ivan Asen II restored Bulgarian supremacy, while the domains of Rostislav Mikhailovich and Jacob Svetoslav later served as buffers between the two states. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, Belgrade and Braničevo remained under Hungarian rule. In the 1360s, the Hungarians captured Vidin and took Ivan Sratsimir prisoner. Under Ivan Shishman, attempts were made to form a Bulgarian-Hungarian alliance against the Ottomans, but old distrust and political fragmentation prevented lasting cooperation.

Around 1200, the Bulgarian army was still recruited chiefly as an opalchenie—a general levy of men capable of bearing arms. This system enabled the ruler to assemble a large army quickly and was particularly suitable for a war of liberation or defence. Armed inhabitants fought for their own lands and could depend on the support of the local population. In 1189, Tsar Peter offered Frederick Barbarossa tens of thousands of troops for a joint expedition against Constantinople. Kaloyan likewise promised an enormous force to the crusaders in 1204. Such offers demonstrate the potential for extensive mobilization, but the figures used in diplomatic negotiations should not be taken literally.

More plausible figures survive for some campaigns. Before the Battle of Adrianople in 1205, Kaloyan had about 30,000 Bulgarians and 14,000 Cuman allies. In 1208, Boril brought approximately 33,000 men into the field near Plovdiv. Other accounts describe Kaloyan's army as “more than the sand of the sea” or compare it to spring flowers. Such images were a medieval way of indicating an immense multitude, not a statistical count. Large armies were possible, but they were difficult to supply and could not remain in the field for long. Every prolonged campaign took peasants away from sowing, harvesting, and the care of livestock.

During the second half of the thirteenth century, the mass levy gradually gave way to professional soldiers. Peasants were often poorly armed, had difficulty maintaining formation, and did not always accept discipline. Some carried only a spear or club and joined campaigns in the hope of plunder. Paid troops were better trained, wore heavy protective equipment, and could regroup on command. Heavy cavalry, organized to some extent on the model of Western knighthood, became increasingly important. Greater striking power allowed armies to become smaller. At Velbazhd in 1330, Michael Shishman had about 12,000 Bulgarians and 3,000 Tatar mercenaries. Two years later, Ivan Alexander commanded 8,000 of his own troops and 2,000 Tatars at Rusokastro.

Fourteenth-century battles involved manoeuvres intended to encircle the enemy, strike a flank, or break through the centre. At Rusokastro, a total of about 13,000 men fought for three hours. Chroniclers present the engagement as exceptionally bloody, but the recorded losses are low: 37 cavalrymen and 60 infantrymen were killed on the Byzantine side, while Bulgarian casualties were probably similar. These figures may be incomplete, but they suggest some features of professional warfare. Armoured soldiers more often sought to disrupt and drive away the enemy than to destroy him. Close formations limited hand-to-hand combat, while mercenaries had little reason to risk their lives needlessly. Significantly, one account gives more attention to the death of the protosebastos's horse—the protosebastos was a high court dignitary—than to the human losses.

The army was not entirely under the tsar's immediate control. Some troops served in fortress garrisons, while other units belonged to the boyars. In the 1320s, the garrison of Plovdiv included about 1,000 heavy cavalrymen and 2,000 infantrymen. The regional lords Voysil and Radoslav could jointly muster approximately 3,000 fighters. In wartime, boyars were required to appear with their military retinues, but they sometimes used these forces for personal purposes or against the ruler in Tarnovo. Letters in which Ivan Shishman urgently requested reinforcements for Nikopol reveal how dangerous this dependence had become by the end of the fourteenth century. It remains unknown whether the summoned boyars actually obeyed him.

The professional army had weaknesses of its own. Mercenary loyalty depended on regular payment, and promises of money or offices could draw soldiers to another claimant. In 1280, George Terter I won over the army in the capital and was proclaimed tsar with its support. The same troops were employed to suppress domestic revolts, pursue bandits, and defend the established social order. Well-armed units could usually disperse peasant crowds with ease. The great exception came in 1278, when Ivaylo's army defeated the mercenaries of Constantine Asen. The victory demonstrated that cohesion and strong leadership could sometimes overcome superior equipment.

The most important allies of the early Asen rulers were the Cumans, a nomadic equestrian people from the steppes between the Lower Danube and the lands north of the Black Sea. Peter and Asen drew them into the war against Byzantium, while Kaloyan reinforced the alliance by marrying a Cuman woman. Byzantine and Western authors describe them as fair-haired and blue-eyed and frequently call them “Scythians,” a general literary term for steppe peoples. Horses formed the basis of their livelihood, movement, and warfare. Chroniclers claim that Cumans would drink blood from a horse's vein when necessary during a campaign; such reports belong to hostile medieval ethnography and should be treated cautiously. In battle, they carried recurved bows, quivers, short spears, swords, and arkans—lassos used to capture people.

Each Cuman warrior might lead about ten horses and change mounts during a long ride. This allowed him to travel quickly, while the spare animals carried plunder. To cross the Danube, Cumans used rafts or carefully sewn leather bags filled with straw. A bag could be tied to a horse's tail and used as a floating support while the animal swam across the river. In battle, Cumans relied on shooting from a distance and feigned flight. They lured pursuers forward, exhausted them, and stretched out their formation before suddenly turning to attack again. The manoeuvre was repeated until the enemy became vulnerable to a decisive assault.

Cuman contingents were generally smaller than the chronicles imply. At Lardea in 1188, Asen had about 6,000 Cuman allies, while at Adrianople in 1205 Kaloyan used 14,000 horsemen under the command of Kocha. They were powerful but unreliable. Their desire for booty could divert them from the battle plan, and their participation depended on available pasture. They arrived at the end of winter and often withdrew in midsummer, when the southern grasslands dried out. In 1207, their departure brought the siege of Adrianople to an end. Sources attribute severe violence in Thrace to them, including the sale of captives and even the sacrifice of attractive prisoners. Some of these reports were probably exaggerated, but plunder was undoubtedly a central motive for their participation.

After Mongol expansion destroyed Cuman power in the thirteenth century, Tatar detachments increasingly entered Bulgarian service. Ivan Asen III had a unit led by Kasim Beg, who later joined Ivaylo. At Velbazhd, Michael Shishman's Tatar horsemen bore the first shock of the unexpected Serbian attack, and many were killed. They rode small, hardy horses, were noted for their discipline, and used massed archery. In 1332, Tatars helped Ivan Alexander encircle the Byzantine army, but he also employed them against his rival Belaur. Service under Bulgarian rulers did not end their independent plundering expeditions. Five major Tatar invasions of Thrace are recorded in the 1340s; the claim that one involved 100,000 people is probably exaggerated.

During the fourteenth century, every Balkan state employed soldiers who might soon become its enemies. John Kantakouzenos brought Turkish companies across the Straits against his political opponents, thereby making further Turkish penetration easier. Bulgarian rulers acted similarly. When Amadeus of Savoy attacked Sozopol in 1366, thirty Turkish ships were present on the Bulgarian side, while Ivan Alexander used Turks against both Byzantines and Hungarians. In 1373, Radin invaded Hungarian territory with Turkish troops. Bulgarian service also attracted Vlachs, Alans, and Western condottieri, or professional mercenaries. Under Theodore Svetoslav, a Latin commander named Martin led 300 armoured horsemen. In 1308, the tsar offered his sister in marriage to Rocafort, leader of about 6,000 Catalans, but the alliance was never completed.

For ordinary people, war meant far more than major battles. Mobilization might take a man away from his fields; passing armies consumed stored food, drove off livestock, and destroyed grain; defeat brought the risk of captivity, enslavement, or displacement. Fortresses offered refuge, but if taken by assault their defenders and inhabitants faced the greatest danger. Campaigning seasons were shaped by pasture, summer heat, and the agricultural calendar. Knowledge of these experiences is uneven because chroniclers were more interested in rulers, wonders, and victories than in the fate of peasants. Despite their exaggerations, their accounts clearly show that war was not an exceptional event but a recurring condition of everyday life.