Arms and Tactics

The Bulgarian army included archers, spearmen, shield-bearers, helmeted troops, slingers, and other specialized fighters. Scouts known as skhodnitsi moved far ahead of the main force. They examined roads and terrain, gathered information about the enemy, and were the first to encounter its vanguard. The Old Bulgarian word voyak meant a soldier and was used for the men assembled in fighting units.

The evidence for army sizes is fragmentary and not always reliable. At Plovdiv, Tsar Boril reportedly commanded about 33,000 men divided into 36 units, suggesting an average regiment of roughly one thousand soldiers. The ruler led a separate formation of 1,600 men. Groups of 300 “chosen warriors” or horsemen are mentioned under Ivan Asen I, Kaloyan, and Theodore Svetoslav. They may have been royal bodyguards, although the sources do not state this directly.

Infantry outnumbered cavalry. The approximate ratio may initially have been about five foot soldiers to each horseman, moving closer to three to one in the fourteenth century. Heavy infantry is mentioned with increasing frequency. Cavalry carried out deep raids, turned enemy flanks, and pursued defeated troops. Small formations of heavy horsemen protected almost entirely by iron were especially prized. With some 3,000 such riders, Michael Shishman threatened Constantinople itself before Andronikos III Palaiologos prevented the attack.

The tsar was normally the supreme commander and often took part in campaigns personally. Ivan Asen I was known for ingenuity, although his companions sometimes had to restrain his excessive daring. Kaloyan rode at the head of his army during campaigns in Thrace, while Boril set a disastrous example by being the first to leave the battlefield at Plovdiv. Beside the ruler stood the great voivode, a senior military commander; under Kaloyan this office was held by the Cuman Manastăr. Other offices included that of protostates, or cavalry commander. Foreign mercenaries were normally led by men from their own communities.

The campaigning court did not consist solely of soldiers. Empress Elena was captured during the siege of Lovech in 1187 and was later in Ivan Asen I's camp on the night of his murder by Ivanko. This shows that, at least in the late twelfth century, the ruler's family might accompany the army. Theodore Komnenos's capture with his relatives at Klokotnitsa suggests that this custom also existed elsewhere in the region during the thirteenth century. It is not known whether Bulgarian empresses continued to travel with the army in later decades.

The bow was a principal missile weapon for infantry and cavalry alike. Composite reflex bows were used, with recurved limbs that increased the power of the shot. Under favourable conditions, their arrows could travel several hundred paces. Byzantine descriptions present the opening of a Bulgarian attack as a “rain of arrows,” while a later Cypriot chronicle praises Bulgarian archers who served on the island.

Iron arrowheads could be leaf-shaped, diamond-shaped, three-bladed, pyramidal, or forked like a swallow's tail. Their form determined their effect: broad heads tore a wider wound, while narrow pyramidal points penetrated deeply and could pass through the rings of mail. Wooden arrows measured approximately 60 centimetres to 1.20 metres. A quiver held about 40, and archers carried spare heads in small bags. The sources also describe whistling arrows with channels in their heads; their use by Bulgarians is likely, but less securely attested.

Spears varied according to their intended use. Long lances could reach about four metres, allowing a horseman to unseat an opponent or keep infantry at a distance. Hooks were sometimes attached near the head and were used at Adrianople to pull heavily armoured knights from their horses. Spears belonging to prominent warriors might carry small pennants or coloured ribbons. Shorter throwing spears had a range of about 25 paces even in the hands of a skilled thrower.

The sulitsa appeared during the thirteenth century. It was a spear with an extended iron section or an entirely iron shaft and could also be used in close combat. A Western account of the battle of Plovdiv describes Bulgarian “green” spears with long Bohemian heads. These were probably painted sulitsas whose coating protected the iron from rust, although this identification remains an interpretation. The stronger weapon offered a suitable response to knightly armour, which an ordinary wooden-shafted spear struggled to penetrate.

The straight, double-edged sword was used for both cutting and thrusting. Some hilts allowed a two-handed grip, while a fuller running along the blade reduced weight without substantially weakening the weapon. Almost no complete Bulgarian swords from the period survive; fragments and images suggest a usual length of roughly 80 centimetres to 1.20 metres, although larger weapons were possible. Sabres had a single edge and a slight curve. A gilded copper scabbard fitting from Tsarevets probably belonged to an expensive weapon kept at the palace.

Battle-axes were used by infantry and by units that cleared roads or undermined fortifications. Iron heads resembling halberds have also been found in the palace at Tărnovo; the palace guard may have carried such weapons. Maces were easier to make and were common among poorer fighters. In 1306, a company of 300 peasants fought chiefly with bows and maces. Hungarian sources also mention “Bulgarian clubs,” probably cudgels whose thick end was reinforced with iron.

Defensive equipment included the shield, helmet, mail shirt, elbow guards, and knee guards, but not every soldier possessed a full set. The separate mention of “helmeted troops” suggests that some militiamen lacked helmets. These could be conical, bell-shaped, or faceted and might have rings or plates protecting the face and neck. Decorated aristocratic helmets bore feathers and crosses. Kaloyan's strong helmet absorbed part of an axe blow, while Isaac II Angelos lost his own after a heavy strike in the Pass of Tryavna.

Shields were made of wood, covered with leather, and often reinforced at the centre with a metal boss or umbo. Large rectangular or heart-shaped shields protected almost the whole body of an infantryman, while cavalry preferred lighter round models. Mail consisted of linked iron rings and allowed freedom of movement, but remained vulnerable to suitable arrows. Armour made of metal plates attached to a leather garment appears more frequently in images. Complete forged armour was probably rarer and used mainly by wealthy horsemen.

Wars often began without a formal warning. A ruler's death could be treated as ending the agreements he had concluded. In 1246, John III Doukas Vatatzes exploited the death of the young Kaliman I Asen and seized southwestern Bulgarian lands. After Vatatzes died in 1254, Michael II Asen responded in the same way and recovered part of the lost territory. In 1332, Andronikos III also justified his invasion by the removal of his sister Theodora from the Bulgarian court after Michael Shishman's death. Dynastic crises, claimants to the throne, and political refugees continually offered convenient grounds for intervention.

The main forces for campaigns into Thrace usually assembled around Sliven and Yambol, from where they could move quickly down the Tundzha valley towards Adrianople. Special units guarded the frontier, and failures of duty were punished with extreme severity. Ditches, embankments, and controlled crossing points restricted movement. A stone column from the Yambol region marked the Bulgarian-Byzantine frontier under Ivan Alexander. In the fourteenth century, Nikephoros Gregoras encountered black-clad border guards near Strumitsa, armed with spears and axes.

Intelligence was crucial to the concentration of an army. Secret messages could be written on linen and sewn into a messenger's clothing. Timely warning probably explains how Ivan Asen II intercepted Theodore Komnenos at Klokotnitsa even though the invader had the shorter route. For urgent orders, runners carried a singed feather as a sign that immediate action was required. Signal fires were lit along the coast in times of danger; Enveri describes such fires when Umur Beg's fleet approached. A similar network probably linked the heights of the interior.

The Balkan Mountains were Tărnovo's strongest natural defence. Fortresses along the southern slopes formed an initial defensive belt, while the passes were blocked with ditches, embankments, and stone walls. At the Dăbovo Pass, the remains of one barrier extend for about 400 metres; the wall was roughly six metres wide and may have reached ten metres in height. A tower controlled the medieval road. Byzantine chroniclers wrote figuratively of “iron gates and copper locks,” but the metaphor reflected real and formidable fortifications.

Camps were enclosed by deep trenches and placed where they could not easily be surprised. In 1328, Bulgarian and Byzantine armies remained opposite one another for about a month without fighting. The royal pavilion stood in the centre of the camp and was guarded at night by beardless youths. After Velbazhd, the Serbs found royal robes and great wealth in Michael Shishman's tent, showing how imposing the travelling court could be. Before battle, the tsar might address the troops, while orders were transmitted by long trumpets.

Battles usually began early in the morning. At Rusokastro in July 1332, the Bulgarians took their positions before dawn. Slingers acted first, hurling stones or specially made projectiles. Archers then showered the enemy with arrows, and spearmen moved forward when the distance became very short. Once the spears broke, close combat began with swords, sabres, axes, and maces. Heavy infantry reinforced the centre, while cavalry and allied Cuman or Tatar units occupied the wings. If successful, the horsemen encircled the enemy or pursued those who fled.

Siege operations required detailed advance reconnaissance. Before the planned assault on Thessaloniki in 1207, Kaloyan sent men to count the towers and measure the distances between them; one report even claims that they counted the battlements. The army was divided into as many units as there were towers, and each regiment was to carry two ladders. The intention was to attack the whole wall at once so that the defenders could not concentrate their forces at one point.

The victory in the Pass of Tryavna in 1190 demonstrates the importance of deception and terrain. Isaac II Angelos crossed the Balkan Mountains and besieged Tărnovo, while the Byzantine fleet was intended to prevent Cuman reinforcements from crossing the Danube. After a prolonged and unsuccessful siege, a man claiming to be a Bulgarian deserter entered the imperial camp. He reported that a large Cuman force was approaching. Without checking the report, the Byzantines abandoned the siege and took the shortest route through the mountains.

Ivan Asen I anticipated their route and waited until the column entered the narrow part of the pass. The Bulgarians allowed the vanguard through and attacked the centre, where the emperor was located. Stones were rolled from the heights, while the narrow, muddy road prevented the Byzantine infantry and baggage train from maintaining order. The retreat turned into panic. Isaac II barely escaped after his men cut a path through their own ranks. Niketas Choniates describes the defeat as almost complete destruction, and the captured imperial insignia and treasure long remained among Bulgaria's most valued trophies.

Contact with Western knights required a different response. During the Third Crusade in 1189, Frederick I Barbarossa's army plundered settlements and executed prisoners; the Bulgarians retaliated with poisoned arrows and brutal violations of the dead, some resembling anti-vampire rites. The knights wore mail or forged armour and carried large shields, long lances, and heavy two-handed swords. Their horses were protected with leather or felt. Squires followed closely behind and used narrow daggers called misericordes to penetrate armour.

Latin camps had a ditch and a wooden palisade. During a difficult march, knights might sleep on the concave inner surface of their shields and subsist on wine and rusks, but they normally had tents, merchants, good food, and women who followed the army. Their strength lay in the organized cavalry charge: the accelerating mass of men, horses, and iron could smash an infantry formation. Once unhorsed, however, a knight was hindered by his heavy equipment. When Kaloyan met Pierre de Bracheux, he could also observe another weakness—knights who became absorbed in pursuit lost formation and were vulnerable from the sides on broken ground.

On 14 April 1205, Kaloyan won a major victory over the Latin forces at Adrianople. His prior knowledge of knightly cavalry, the use of suitable terrain, and the availability of weapons capable of unseating heavy horsemen help explain how the Bulgarian army could confront the most dangerous striking force of the age. Nevertheless, details of equipment and formations must be reconstructed from chronicles, murals, manuscript illuminations, and archaeological finds. The size of regiments, the exact proportion of heavy troops, and the prevalence of sulitsas or whistling arrows therefore remain approximate.