The Great Battles

Military life in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries involved much more than the clash itself. Armies marched along difficult roads, searched for food and fodder, fortified their camps, posted guards, attended religious services, and waited for reports from scouts. The fullest descriptions come from Western and Byzantine chroniclers, some of whom were direct participants. They make it possible to reconstruct individual manoeuvres and even the sounds of battle trumpets, although the size of the armies usually remains disputed.

Tsar Kaloyan’s most famous victory was prepared by the revolt of the Thracian Romaioi, the name by which the Byzantines identified themselves. Early in 1205, the local aristocracy promised to recognize him as emperor if he protected them from the Latin Empire, founded after the crusaders captured Constantinople. Didymoteicho, Adrianople, and other cities destroyed their Latin garrisons. Emperor Baldwin I reached Adrianople with an army whose exact size cannot be established. One Western account mentions 240 knights but does not reliably count their squires, sergeants—professional soldiers of lower rank—or the other units. Venetians commanded by Doge Enrico Dandolo also took part in the siege.

Kaloyan placed his main forces about 20 kilometres from Adrianople. Medieval tradition credits him with approximately 30,000 Bulgarians and 14,000 Cumans, but such figures cannot be accepted without reservation. On 13 April, the Cuman cavalry attacked the Latin camp and attempted to drive away the warhorses and livestock kept for food. The operation both supplied the army and tested the enemy’s response. The knights rode out without unified command and pursued the retreating horsemen for more than four kilometres. The Cumans repeatedly turned and shot at their horses. That evening a Latin council prohibited another pursuit, but the order failed to hold even for one day.

During the night, the Bulgarians moved secretly into broken country north of Adrianople. Woods, hills, and narrow passages restricted heavy cavalry, while concealed pits and ditches were probably prepared. On 14 April, the knights attended a festive morning service and ate before the Cumans reappeared around noon. Count Louis of Blois disobeyed orders and led the vanguard after them; the remaining units, including the emperor’s division, followed. The long ride stretched their ranks and tired their horses, and three of the four Latin divisions entered the prepared ground. The Bulgarians closed the ring before the knights could deliver their customary massed charge.

The battle lasted about three hours. Louis of Blois was severely wounded, while Baldwin fought among his men as the encircled force gradually disintegrated. Accounts mention nooses used to pull riders down, the cutting of horses’ legs, and even scythes employed as weapons—a detail that may indicate the participation of armed peasants. Robert of Clari puts the losses at more than 300 knights, demonstrating how uncertain the earlier figure of 240 must be. Baldwin was captured and brought before Kaloyan in chains. The rout at Adrianople proved that heavy knightly cavalry could be defeated through mounted archery, a feigned retreat, and carefully selected terrain.

Tsar Boril attempted to use the same approach against Emperor Henry in 1208, but the Latins had learned from their defeat. Near Plovdiv they suffered from a shortage of food and sent out units to gather supplies, yet Henry did not allow his knights to chase the withdrawing Cumans. On 1 August he advanced with eighteen divisions, three Byzantine and fifteen Latin. The reported twenty knights in most Latin divisions and fifty in the imperial one did not necessarily include all accompanying troops. The Western narrative gives Boril 33,000 men in thirty-six units, though this excessive precision is doubtful. While the Cumans performed their customary withdrawal, a concealed force under Geoffrey of Villehardouin struck the tsar’s guard. It fled and carried the rest of the army with it, while the Latins halted their pursuit before the mountain slopes. Their battle cry was “Holy Sepulchre,” but discipline and ambush were the main causes of victory.

At Velbazhd in 1330, supplies and a broken truce proved decisive. Serbian texts give plainly exaggerated figures, including as many as 80,000 Bulgarians and even a coalition of seven rulers. More restrained Byzantine information assigns Michael Shishman 12,000 Bulgarians and 3,000 Tatar, Vlach, and Yas, or Alan, mercenaries. The Serbian army numbered about 15,000 and received approximately 1,000 additional heavily armed Westerners immediately before the battle, including Spaniards, Italians, and 300 German condottieri—professional mercenary soldiers. Michael Shishman was probably waiting for his Byzantine ally, while King Stefan Dečanski sought to gain time until his reinforcements arrived.

A one-day truce was agreed on 27 July. The Bulgarians used the pause to send part of their army foraging for food and horse fodder. The following morning, the Western mercenaries arrived with Stefan Dušan, and the Serbian side attacked the dispersed enemy. Michael Shishman managed to arrange the available units, but the Tatars could not withstand the first charge of the heavy cavalry. The fighting was brief and fierce, and many Bulgarians were killed or captured. Ordinary soldiers were released under the rule that closely related peoples should not enslave one another. The captive boyars mourned the tsar by asking, “Where now is your golden throne?” The sources disagree about his death: he fell from his horse and was mortally injured, but some accounts say that he survived for another three days. Stefan Dečanski arranged a ceremonial burial for him, while the defeat permanently weakened Bulgarian authority in the southwestern lands.

The Battle of Rusokastro on 18 July 1332 is among the best documented because it was described by the participant John Kantakouzenos, his contemporary Nikephoros Gregoras, and a short Bulgarian eulogy. Emperor Andronikos III had occupied several fortresses south of the Balkan Mountains with almost no resistance. Ivan Alexander, however, reached the Aytos region in five days with about 8,000 men, while the Byzantine force at Rusokastro numbered approximately 3,000. A narrow, stony pass lay between the camps and was occupied by Bulgarian infantry. Negotiations followed over the rights to the disputed territories. Ivan Alexander probably prolonged them while awaiting reinforcements, and during the night before the battle 2,000 Tatar horsemen arrived.

At dawn the Bulgarian army moved into the plain. Heavy infantry formed a reinforced centre, while the Tatars operated separately on both wings and threatened the enemy rear. Andronikos III arranged his troops in sixteen divisions. When the Byzantines heard a Tatar trumpet, they initially reassured themselves that the sound came from Vlachs imitating Tatar signals. Sunrise revealed the actual cavalry, and the emperor bent his thin battle line into a crescent to protect its wings. The Tatar charge quickly scattered the flanks. The six central divisions, including Andronikos and fifty selected soldiers, initially resisted the Bulgarian pressure but then withdrew towards Rusokastro. The inhabitants barred the gates; the fugitives broke through them and killed some of the townspeople. After about three hours, the Byzantine army had been driven against the fortress, leaving Ivan Alexander in possession of the field.

By noon the Bulgarian tsar had offered peace, the restoration of the old treaties, and a dynastic marriage. Oaths were sworn that day, and on the next the rulers held a shared feast. Kantakouzenos presents their conversation in a way that emphasizes Andronikos’s courage and claims that Ivan Alexander had almost decided to retreat; this plainly softens the impression of defeat. The Bulgarian eulogy goes to the opposite extreme by declaring that the emperor was captured. Nikephoros Gregoras speaks of unexpected mercy shown by the Bulgarian ruler. A formal capture cannot be proved, but Andronikos was clearly in a dangerous position. The words attributed to Ivan Alexander, “The year has four seasons,” conveyed a warning that the fortunes of war can change quickly.

In the mid-fourteenth century, civil warfare brought Momchil to prominence. He had first been a “honsar,” meaning a highway robber, but later became a commander and ruler in the Rhodope region. Chroniclers exaggerate his enormous height, yet consistently emphasize his personal courage. During the Byzantine civil war he commanded about 2,000 horsemen and created a principality between the lower courses of the Mesta and Arda rivers. In 1344 he burned ships belonging to Umur Bey, thereby opposing the transport of Turkish forces across the Straits. In the following summer, about 20,000 Turkish cavalry crossed against him. Momchil had only 5,000 infantry and 300 horsemen, if the reported numbers are approximately correct.

The decisive battle took place before Peritheorion on 7 July 1345. The townspeople closed their gates and declared that they would admit the victor, although they cautiously allowed Momchil’s cousin Rayko to enter with fifty men. Momchil used old earthworks, which the Turkish vanguard crossed before dispersing to plunder. The main forces of Umur Bey and John VI Kantakouzenos arrived to find the Bulgarian formation still intact. Turkish archers held the right wing, Byzantine heavy infantry the left, and selected mixed troops formed the centre. Driven against the city walls, Momchil dismounted and took his place with the infantry. The Turks also dismounted and shot from the surrounding ring, while Byzantine cavalry closed the other side. The narrative claims that Momchil’s men neither surrendered nor fled. Resistance ended only after his death, and almost his entire army was destroyed.

Night could turn a poorly guarded camp into a deadly trap. In 1186 Emperor Isaac II Angelos sent the blind Caesar John Kantakouzenos against the Bulgarian rebels. Caesar was a high court title close to imperial rank. The commander left his camp in open country without a defensive ditch, embankment, forward posts, or adequate watches. Peter and Asen attacked at night from several directions. Many Byzantines were killed in their tents or while fleeing, before they could arm themselves. Kantakouzenos mounted his Arabian stallion and escaped into the darkness, while the Bulgarians captured his standards, tents, and gold-woven dark-blue robes. Peter and Asen draped the captured garments over their shoulders before the victorious army—a visible sign that the prestige of the imperial commander had passed into their hands.

The night attack at Chernomen in 1371 had still more serious consequences. The rulers Vukašin and Uglješa led a mixed army of Serbs, Bulgarians, and Byzantines towards Adrianople. The figure of 60,000 is probably exaggerated, but the army was undoubtedly large. Prolonged rain had swollen the Maritsa, and the commanders trusted that the river and their numerical superiority protected them from Hacı İlber’s force of approximately 5,000 Turks. On the evening of 25 September, the Christian camp was left without the necessary precautions. The Turks found a ford and attacked the sleeping army after midnight on 26 September. Panic and mass killing followed; Vukašin and Uglješa also died. Later Ottoman narratives claim that Lala Şahin had Hacı İlber killed so that he could claim the glory of the victory, but this story is itself part of a struggle over credit.

Field battles were only the most spectacular aspect of warfare. The state centred on Tarnovo also depended on fortified belts: some castles guarded the northern approaches against Tatars and Hungarians, while others blocked Byzantine advances from the south. Small watch fortresses with limited garrisons stood in the Rhodope Mountains, Sredna Gora, and the Balkan range. For most soldiers, service probably involved more guard duty, marching, foraging, and exhausting sieges than participation in a decisive battle. The great engagements nevertheless show how these routine tasks determined the outcome: an army without food, reconnaissance, discipline, or night watches could be destroyed regardless of its numbers and courage.