The army and its commanders

The military ranks in the capital are a conventional group of offices and titles associated with central command, the court, or the ruler’s protection in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. They may be taken to include the great voivode, the protostrator, and the protokelliotes, although the sources do not present them as a unified department. The sparse evidence demonstrates the tsar’s leading role in warfare but does not permit a complete reconstruction of the command hierarchy.


The designation “military ranks in the capital” does not refer to an attested medieval department or a distinct branch of government. It brings together offices that probably participated in directing the army and court titles possibly connected with cavalry, palace ceremony, or the ruler’s protection. The boundary between an active military office and an honorary position in the hierarchy therefore often remains unclear.

The wars of the Second Bulgarian Empire are described in considerable detail, particularly in Greek narrative sources. This does not mean, however, that the internal structure of the army is well known. Chroniclers report campaigns, battles, and commanders but seldom identify their precise offices, command units, or methods of recruitment.

The tsar was supreme commander, and his involvement was not merely symbolic. Ivan Asen I and Kaloyan personally directed military operations, while Boril led campaigns in Thrace. Ivan Asen II fought at Klokotnitsa and later took part in the siege of Çorlu. Michael II Asen was wounded during a Thracian campaign, while the disabled Konstantin Tih Asen continued to accompany the army in a chariot and was killed in the struggle against Ivaylo. After taking the throne, Ivaylo personally organized the defence against the Tatars and Byzantines. Michael III Shishman likewise stood at the head of his army and was killed at Velbazhd. In the surviving narratives, Bulgarian rulers personally led their campaigns more often than Byzantine emperors did.

Command could also be entrusted to other members of the elite, although it is not known whether they held permanent military offices. Soon after the restoration of the empire, Dobromir Chrysos was sent to fight in Macedonia. The sebastokrator Alexander—holder of one of the highest court ranks—led resistance to a Hungarian invasion of the northwestern territories. In the 1320s Ivan Rusina conducted operations in Thrace and approached Constantinople. In these cases the sources provide the commander’s name or court dignity but not a specialized command post. Leadership of a campaign therefore does not by itself prove possession of a military rank.

The position of the Cuman Manastăr, who is associated with Kaloyan’s death before Thessalonica, is especially controversial. In the Greek account he is called the “ἀρχιστρατηγός” and “στρατηγός” of the tsar’s army, meaning its chief or leading commander. This is not enough to identify him as great voivode: a closer Greek equivalent for that title would be “ὁ μέγας στρατηγός,” while the Slavonic translation uses descriptive phrases for a commander of the forces. The text allows for the possibility that Manastăr was a high-ranking Bulgarian dignitary, but he may instead have led Cuman auxiliary troops. The presence of Cuman families among the Bulgarian aristocracy makes the first possibility plausible without proving it.

The Lives of St John of Rila relate that Kaloyan’s body was escorted to Tarnovo by three hundred picked warriors. The phrase may refer to a selected guard, but it does not demonstrate the existence of a permanent palace guard or a separate elite fighting unit. This isolated report cannot support a reconstruction of the army’s internal divisions.

The empire’s principal forces appear to have been under central command, although local troops probably also existed. Military offices encountered in provincial government suggest their presence, but their organization is unknown. This arrangement differed from the classical Byzantine theme system, in which a theme was a military-administrative province and local command combined military and civil authority. There is insufficient evidence for assuming an identical structure in the Second Bulgarian Empire.

The method by which ordinary soldiers were recruited is also uncertain. A popular levy probably existed, but the expense of equipment and the skills required for combat make it doubtful that such levies formed the main body of a late medieval army. There is no direct evidence for the organized use of foreign mercenaries. Cuman detachments seem to have operated as allied forces attracted by the prospect of plunder rather than as salaried soldiers.

The question of pronoia also remains uncertain. Pronoia was a conditional grant of revenues, normally associated with service to the ruler. The institution was important in Byzantium and Serbia, and a similar practice in Bulgaria is possible and even likely. Bulgarian sources provide no direct confirmation, however, so pronoia cannot serve as a secure basis for reconstructing the organization of the army.

The idea that great landowners were required to raise and equip their own detachments for the tsar’s army is likewise unproven. It derives more from a general model of a “feudal levy” than from specific Bulgarian evidence. Serbian regulations requiring men to appear before the ruler with horses and officials cannot automatically be applied to Bulgaria. The two states probably had similar practices, but provincial power in Serbia depended much more heavily on local lords, and the people mentioned in those texts were not necessarily landholding warriors.

One of the few concrete descriptions of the army’s battle order was left by Henry of Valenciennes. At the battle near Philippopolis, Boril reportedly brought 33,000 men divided into thirty-six formations, described in Old French as “batailles.” If the figures are approximately accurate, each division contained around a thousand fighters. Its Bulgarian designation has not survived; the suggestion that it was called a “plŭk” remains unproven.

Warriors also occupied a distinct place in social ideology. In Western and Central Europe, words meaning warrior often designated members of the aristocracy, and similar usage is known from Serbian texts. There is no evidence that “warriors” was an official estate designation in Bulgaria. In the works of Patriarch Euthymius, the hymns of Ephrem, and various liturgical prayers, however, the army is mentioned separately from the rest of the people, alongside the tsar, the palace, or the clergy. This emphasizes its special importance but does not establish the existence of a legally defined military estate.

Among the specific central offices, the great voivode was probably the one most directly associated with active command. “Voivode” is a Slavonic designation for a military leader, while the addition of “great” placed its holder above ordinary commanders. The office may be understood as that of the tsar’s deputy in military affairs, but the surviving evidence does not precisely define its powers, its place in every period, or its relationship with the commanders of individual campaigns.

The protokelliotes appears to have belonged to the court dignitaries, but his presumed military responsibilities are not directly attested. Two holders of the title are known, and one of them, Priyazd, is recorded as having died in battle. His death in military action does not by itself prove that the office was normally an army post, nor does it reveal its everyday duties.

The protostrator has a clearer Byzantine parallel and is conventionally associated with the court, the ruler’s horses, and ceremonial service. Bulgarian evidence, however, is limited to at least one secure holder, Kasimbek, a close associate of the tsar. His precise duties are not stated, and defining the office as wholly ceremonial remains conjectural. The fact that the title was entrusted to a Tatar may instead suggest direct involvement in military leadership. The isolated attestations of the protostrator, protokelliotes, and other central ranks do not establish precisely when they were introduced or when they disappeared.