The army and its commanders

The designation “military ranks in the capital” does not refer to an attested medieval department or a distinct branch of government. It brings together offices that probably participated in directing the army and court titles possibly connected with cavalry, palace ceremony, or the ruler’s protection. The boundary between an active military office and an honorary position in the hierarchy therefore often remains unclear.

The wars of the Second Bulgarian Empire are described in considerable detail, particularly in Greek narrative sources. This does not mean, however, that the internal structure of the army is well known. Chroniclers report campaigns, battles, and commanders but seldom identify their precise offices, command units, or methods of recruitment.

The tsar was supreme commander, and his involvement was not merely symbolic. Ivan Asen I and Kaloyan personally directed military operations, while Boril led campaigns in Thrace. Ivan Asen II fought at Klokotnitsa and later took part in the siege of Çorlu. Michael II Asen was wounded during a Thracian campaign, while the disabled Konstantin Tih Asen continued to accompany the army in a chariot and was killed in the struggle against Ivaylo. After taking the throne, Ivaylo personally organized the defence against the Tatars and Byzantines. Michael III Shishman likewise stood at the head of his army and was killed at Velbazhd. In the surviving narratives, Bulgarian rulers personally led their campaigns more often than Byzantine emperors did.

Command could also be entrusted to other members of the elite, although it is not known whether they held permanent military offices. Soon after the restoration of the empire, Dobromir Chrysos was sent to fight in Macedonia. The sebastokrator Alexander—holder of one of the highest court ranks—led resistance to a Hungarian invasion of the northwestern territories. In the 1320s Ivan Rusina conducted operations in Thrace and approached Constantinople. In these cases the sources provide the commander’s name or court dignity but not a specialized command post. Leadership of a campaign therefore does not by itself prove possession of a military rank.

The position of the Cuman Manastăr, who is associated with Kaloyan’s death before Thessalonica, is especially controversial. In the Greek account he is called the “ἀρχιστρατηγός” and “στρατηγός” of the tsar’s army, meaning its chief or leading commander. This is not enough to identify him as great voivode: a closer Greek equivalent for that title would be “ὁ μέγας στρατηγός,” while the Slavonic translation uses descriptive phrases for a commander of the forces. The text allows for the possibility that Manastăr was a high-ranking Bulgarian dignitary, but he may instead have led Cuman auxiliary troops. The presence of Cuman families among the Bulgarian aristocracy makes the first possibility plausible without proving it.

The Lives of St John of Rila relate that Kaloyan’s body was escorted to Tarnovo by three hundred picked warriors. The phrase may refer to a selected guard, but it does not demonstrate the existence of a permanent palace guard or a separate elite fighting unit. This isolated report cannot support a reconstruction of the army’s internal divisions.

The empire’s principal forces appear to have been under central command, although local troops probably also existed. Military offices encountered in provincial government suggest their presence, but their organization is unknown. This arrangement differed from the classical Byzantine theme system, in which a theme was a military-administrative province and local command combined military and civil authority. There is insufficient evidence for assuming an identical structure in the Second Bulgarian Empire.

The method by which ordinary soldiers were recruited is also uncertain. A popular levy probably existed, but the expense of equipment and the skills required for combat make it doubtful that such levies formed the main body of a late medieval army. There is no direct evidence for the organized use of foreign mercenaries. Cuman detachments seem to have operated as allied forces attracted by the prospect of plunder rather than as salaried soldiers.

The question of pronoia also remains uncertain. Pronoia was a conditional grant of revenues, normally associated with service to the ruler. The institution was important in Byzantium and Serbia, and a similar practice in Bulgaria is possible and even likely. Bulgarian sources provide no direct confirmation, however, so pronoia cannot serve as a secure basis for reconstructing the organization of the army.

The idea that great landowners were required to raise and equip their own detachments for the tsar’s army is likewise unproven. It derives more from a general model of a “feudal levy” than from specific Bulgarian evidence. Serbian regulations requiring men to appear before the ruler with horses and officials cannot automatically be applied to Bulgaria. The two states probably had similar practices, but provincial power in Serbia depended much more heavily on local lords, and the people mentioned in those texts were not necessarily landholding warriors.

One of the few concrete descriptions of the army’s battle order was left by Henry of Valenciennes. At the battle near Philippopolis, Boril reportedly brought 33,000 men divided into thirty-six formations, described in Old French as “batailles.” If the figures are approximately accurate, each division contained around a thousand fighters. Its Bulgarian designation has not survived; the suggestion that it was called a “plŭk” remains unproven.

Warriors also occupied a distinct place in social ideology. In Western and Central Europe, words meaning warrior often designated members of the aristocracy, and similar usage is known from Serbian texts. There is no evidence that “warriors” was an official estate designation in Bulgaria. In the works of Patriarch Euthymius, the hymns of Ephrem, and various liturgical prayers, however, the army is mentioned separately from the rest of the people, alongside the tsar, the palace, or the clergy. This emphasizes its special importance but does not establish the existence of a legally defined military estate.

Among the specific central offices, the great voivode was probably the one most directly associated with active command. “Voivode” is a Slavonic designation for a military leader, while the addition of “great” placed its holder above ordinary commanders. The office may be understood as that of the tsar’s deputy in military affairs, but the surviving evidence does not precisely define its powers, its place in every period, or its relationship with the commanders of individual campaigns.

The protokelliotes appears to have belonged to the court dignitaries, but his presumed military responsibilities are not directly attested. Two holders of the title are known, and one of them, Priyazd, is recorded as having died in battle. His death in military action does not by itself prove that the office was normally an army post, nor does it reveal its everyday duties.

The protostrator has a clearer Byzantine parallel and is conventionally associated with the court, the ruler’s horses, and ceremonial service. Bulgarian evidence, however, is limited to at least one secure holder, Kasimbek, a close associate of the tsar. His precise duties are not stated, and defining the office as wholly ceremonial remains conjectural. The fact that the title was entrusted to a Tatar may instead suggest direct involvement in military leadership. The isolated attestations of the protostrator, protokelliotes, and other central ranks do not establish precisely when they were introduced or when they disappeared.

The label “military ranks in the capital” does not point to a confirmed medieval office or to a separate arm of government. Instead, it groups together posts that probably had a role in running the army, along with court titles that may have been tied to cavalry, palace ceremony, or the ruler’s protection. Because of that, the line between a real military office and an honorary rank is often hard to draw.

We know a great deal about the wars of the Second Bulgarian Empire, especially from Greek narrative sources. But that does not mean we know much about how the army was organized on the inside. The chroniclers describe campaigns, battles, and commanders, yet they rarely say what office a commander held, what units he led, or how soldiers were recruited.

The tsar was the highest commander, and this was not just a ceremonial role. Ivan Asen I and Kaloyan personally directed military operations, while Boril led campaigns in Thrace. Ivan Asen II fought at Klokotnitsa and later joined the siege of Çorlu. Michael II Asen was wounded in a Thracian campaign, and the disabled Konstantin Tih Asen still traveled with the army in a chariot before being killed in the struggle against Ivaylo. After he took the throne, Ivaylo personally organized the defence against the Tatars and Byzantines. Michael III Shishman also stood at the head of his army and died at Velbazhd. In the surviving accounts, Bulgarian rulers led their own campaigns more often than Byzantine emperors did.

Command could also be given to other members of the elite, though we do not know whether they held fixed military offices. Soon after the restoration of the empire, Dobromir Chrysos was sent to fight in Macedonia. The sebastokrator Alexander, who held one of the highest court ranks, led resistance to a Hungarian invasion of the northwestern territories. In the 1320s Ivan Rusina carried out operations in Thrace and moved toward Constantinople. In all these cases, the sources give the commander’s name or court title, but not a special command post. So the fact that someone led a campaign does not by itself prove that he held a military rank.

The case of the Cuman Manastăr, who is linked to Kaloyan’s death before Thessalonica, is especially disputed. In the Greek account he is called the “ἀρχιστρατηγός” and “στρατηγός” of the tsar’s army, meaning its chief or leading commander. That is not enough to identify him as great voivode: a closer Greek equivalent for that title would be “ὁ μέγας στρατηγός,” while the Slavonic translation uses descriptive phrases for a commander of the forces. The text leaves open the possibility that Manastăr was a high-ranking Bulgarian dignitary, but he may also have been in charge of Cuman auxiliary troops. Since Cuman families were part of the Bulgarian aristocracy, the first option is possible, though it cannot be proved.

The Lives of St John of Rila say that Kaloyan’s body was taken to Tarnovo by three hundred picked warriors. This may mean a chosen guard, but it does not show that there was a permanent palace guard or a separate elite fighting force. One report like this is not enough to rebuild the army’s internal divisions.

The empire’s main forces seem to have been under central command, although there probably were local troops as well. Military offices that appear in provincial government suggest that such forces existed, but we do not know how they were arranged. This was different from the classic Byzantine theme system, where a theme was both a military and administrative province, and local command combined military and civil power. There is not enough evidence to assume that the Second Bulgarian Empire had the same setup.

We also do not know exactly how ordinary soldiers were recruited. A popular levy, meaning a call-up of ordinary men, probably existed, but the cost of weapons and the training needed for combat make it unlikely that such levies formed the main part of a late medieval army. There is no direct proof that foreign mercenaries were used in an organized way. Cuman detachments seem instead to have acted as allied forces drawn by the chance of plunder, not as paid soldiers.

The place of pronoia is uncertain too. Pronoia was a conditional grant of revenue, usually linked to service to the ruler. The system mattered in Byzantium and Serbia, and a similar practice in Bulgaria is possible, even likely. But Bulgarian sources give no direct proof, so pronoia cannot be used as firm evidence for how the army was organized.

The claim that major landowners had to raise and equip their own troops for the tsar’s army is also unproven. It comes more from a broad idea of a “feudal levy” than from clear Bulgarian evidence. Serbian rules that required men to appear before the ruler with horses and officials cannot simply be applied to Bulgaria. The two states probably had similar customs, but power in the Serbian provinces depended much more on local lords, and the people named in those texts were not necessarily landholding warriors.

One of the few clear descriptions of battle formation comes from Henry of Valenciennes. At the battle near Philippopolis, Boril reportedly brought 33,000 men split into thirty-six formations, called “batailles” in Old French. If those numbers are close to right, each division had about a thousand fighters. We do not know the Bulgarian word for this unit. The suggestion that it was called a “plŭk” has not been proven.

Warriors also had a special place in social ideas. In Western and Central Europe, words for warrior often meant members of the nobility, and similar usage is found in Serbian texts. There is no evidence that “warriors” was an official social estate in Bulgaria. But in the works of Patriarch Euthymius, the hymns of Ephrem, and various liturgical prayers, the army is mentioned separately from the rest of the people, alongside the tsar, the palace, or the clergy. This shows that it mattered a great deal, but it does not prove that there was a legally defined military estate.

Among the main offices at the center, the great voivode was probably the one most closely tied to active command. “Voivode” is a Slavonic word for a military leader, and the addition of “great” marked a rank above ordinary commanders. The office may have been the tsar’s deputy in military matters, but the surviving evidence does not define its powers exactly, say when its role changed, or show how it related to the commanders of individual campaigns.

The protokelliotes seems to have been one of the court dignitaries, but his supposed military duties are not directly confirmed. We know of two men who held the title, and one of them, Priyazd, died in battle. Yet dying in war does not prove that the office was usually a military one, and it tells us nothing certain about its everyday work.

The protostrator has a clearer Byzantine counterpart and is normally linked with the court, the ruler’s horses, and ceremonial service. In Bulgarian evidence, however, we can point to at least one secure holder, Kasimbek, who was a close associate of the tsar. His exact duties are not given, so it is only a guess to call the office purely ceremonial. The fact that the title was given to a Tatar may instead point to a direct role in military leadership. The few mentions of the protostrator, protokelliotes, and other central ranks do not tell us exactly when these offices were created or when they disappeared.

The article says we do not really know how the army of the Second Bulgarian Empire was built. The tsar often led campaigns himself. Ivan Asen I, Kaloyan, Ivan Asen II, Ivaylo, and Michael III Shishman all fought at the head of their armies. This shows that the ruler was the main commander.

Some nobles also led wars, but their exact jobs are unclear. The best-known military office was the great voivode, which was probably the tsar’s top army leader. Other court titles may have had military duties too, but this is not certain.

The article also says that the army’s inside structure, soldier recruitment, and local forces are still hard to pin down. There may have been a levy of ordinary men and allied Cuman troops, but the proof is weak. So the main point is that Bulgaria clearly had strong armies, but the exact system behind them is still mostly unknown.