Battle of Velbazhd

In the first quarter of the fourteenth century Serbia, under the kings of the Nemanjić dynasty, was rapidly growing stronger and expanding southward into Macedonia at the expense of a weakened Byzantium. This growth threatened both Bulgaria and the empire. Tsar Michael III Shishman Asen (reigned 1323–1330) concluded an alliance with the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos: the two allies planned a coordinated campaign to break Serbian power and divide the conquered lands between them.

Michael Shishman gathered a large army reinforced with mercenaries — the sources mention Alan and other foreign contingents among them. The plan was for the Bulgarian and Byzantine armies to strike Serbia simultaneously from the east and the south. The Bulgarian tsar marched west, passed through Vidin and turned due south, while King Stefan Dečanski deployed his forces to guard the road to the central Serbian lands and Kosovo.

The two armies came face to face at Velbazhd (modern Kyustendil). Negotiations followed and a one-day truce was agreed — likely of benefit above all to the Serbs, who needed to rest after their long march. It was during this truce that the awaited Serbian reinforcements arrived, among them a heavily armed detachment led by the heir Stefan Dušan.

On 28 July 1330, somewhere between Velbazhd and Zemen, the Serbs broke the truce and struck by surprise. Part of the Bulgarian army had scattered to forage across the district, while the rest — caught off guard and probably fewer than expected — could not re-form their line in time. A heavy rout followed: some of the Bulgarians were killed and others taken captive, and the same fate met the detachments scattered about the countryside.

So ended an otherwise well-conceived and well-organised campaign. Tsar Michael Shishman not only failed to carry out his design but lost his life on the field.

The sources unanimously link the battle to the death of the Bulgarian tsar, but differ on the circumstances. The Byzantine authors John Kantakouzenos and Nikephoros Gregoras state that Michael was wounded in the fighting, taken while still alive to the Serbian camp, and died soon after — according to Gregoras on the fourth day, 'because he could not bear his mortal wounds'. The Serbian archbishop Danilo gives another version: the tsar was thrown from his horse and killed by Serbian soldiers on the field itself; his body was brought before King Stefan Dečanski and buried in the monastery church of St George at Staro Nagoričane. Gregory Tsamblak offers yet a third account.

Velbazhd did not bring a Serbian conquest of Bulgaria. The ensuing peace preserved the Bulgarian state, but under Serbian influence: Ana Neda, sister of Stefan Dečanski, was restored to the Tarnovo throne together with her son Ivan Stefan. Soon, however, this line too was deposed by a boyar coup in favour of Ivan Alexander.

The real consequence of Velbazhd was strategic rather than territorial. The initiative in the struggle for Macedonia and primacy in the Balkans passed lastingly to Serbia. Only a year later Stefan Dušan overthrew his father and took the throne; under him the Serbian state reached its height and spread over much of the peninsula. Velbazhd marks the turning point after which Bulgaria finally surrendered its leading role in the Balkans.

The account that follows sets out the military operations in greater detail, drawing on the Bulgarian Military History of the Middle Ages by D. Angelov and B. Cholpanov.

The death of George Terter II, which occurred before 1322, left Bulgaria in a vulnerable position, with a serious Byzantine threat looming over the country. This period of political instability and external danger provoked a reaction among the Tarnovo nobility, who decided to elect the Byzantine ruler Michael III Shishman as Tsar of Bulgaria. He ascended the throne in 1322 and ruled until 1330, with his reign marked by continuous military conflicts.

Immediately after his accession to the throne in 1322, Michael III Shishman took command of a Bulgarian army that included mercenary Tatar detachments. This army undertook sieges of towns located between Sliven and Nesemvrya, which after the death of George Terter II had fallen under Byzantine control. These military actions were part of Michael III Shishman’s efforts to restore Bulgarian control over the lost territories.

In response to these actions, the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III managed in the same year, 1322, to lift the siege of Plovdiv, which represented a significant military success for Byzantium. Following this success, Andronikos III decided to focus his attention on Michael III Shishman and to take measures against him. To this end, he ordered the Bulgarian nobleman Voysil to return to his native lands, gather an army, and lead it to the strategic settlement of Potuka.

Voysil, who was the ruler of the fortress Kopsis and the surrounding lands, proved to be a key figure in this conflict. He was an opponent of Michael III Shishman, and Andronikos III relied on his assistance, planning to arrive at the head of Roman (Byzantine) troops in Potuka to join forces with Voysil’s army. This coordination between the Byzantine forces and the Bulgarian nobleman was strategically important for the Byzantines in their efforts to weaken Michael III Shishman.

The fortress Kopsis, known to the local population as Anevsko Kale, occupies an exceptionally defensible position. It is situated on a rocky outcrop rising about 400 meters above the Karlovo plain, north of the present-day town of Sopot. This location provides the defenders with a wide view of the valley stretching from the village of Banya to the village of Rozino, which is of great strategic importance for monitoring enemy movements.

Kopsis is naturally fortified with steep and impassable slopes from the east and west, with the only accessible point being from the north. This makes the fortress extremely difficult to capture and turns it into a key stronghold for Voysil’s troops. Petar Mutafchiev, a prominent Bulgarian historian, describes the fortress in detail, emphasizing its complex structure and defensive features.

The citadel of Kopsis consists of two parts, with the southern part overhanging the plain. This section is a narrow and long building erected on the rock, approximately 32 meters in length and with an average height of 4.20 meters. Although the southern side of the building, measuring 8-9 meters in length, is completely destroyed, the middle and northern parts are very well preserved, which testifies to the quality of the construction and the importance of this part of the fortress.

The eastern and western walls of the building are between 1.30 and 1.50 meters thick, and their interior height reaches 8-9 meters, providing significant protection against attackers. This architectural feature highlights the strategic role of Kopsis as a defensive point and a base for military operations in the region during the conflict between Michael III Shishman and the Byzantine forces.

The fortified settlement at Velbazhd represents an impressive example of medieval fortress architecture, whose walls are constructed from unhewn stones bonded with mortar, into which crushed tiles have been mixed. This construction technique not only provides strength but also demonstrates the builders' knowledge of improving the binding material. Longitudinal and transverse beams, called santrachi, are embedded in the walls to enhance the structure's stability. Today, the beds of these beams are well preserved and can be clearly observed, providing valuable information about the construction methods of the era.

The shape of the described part of the fortified settlement is closely linked to the features of the terrain on which it was erected. The terrain consists of a narrow and long rock, which was used as a natural defense. To expand the structure, outworks were built both to the east and to the west, demonstrating an effort to make maximum use of the available space and to strengthen the defensive capabilities.

In the eastern wall of the fortress there is a small gate measuring 1.15 meters in width and 1.5 meters in height. This gate leads over the rock, which suggests that there was likely a wooden ladder providing access to it. This detail is important for understanding how the entrances and exits of the fortress functioned, as well as the tactical possibilities for defense or evacuation.

The second, northern part of the fortified settlement is a polygonal building with an area of about 40 square meters. The southwestern corner of this part is preserved up to an impressive height of 6 meters, allowing an impression of the scale and grandeur of the structure. The northern part is built in the same way and from the same material as the first, indicating a unified architectural style and construction technique.

The two parts of the fortified settlement are connected by a narrow corridor built on the ridge of the rock. The western wall of this corridor protrudes over the rock in some places, while the eastern wall is almost completely destroyed. This corridor likely served as a communication link between the two main parts of the fortress and had strategic importance for the movement of the defenders.

Archaeological excavations and research at the fortress were conducted by I. Djambov, who uncovered an impressive building, probably two-storied, which he provisionally called the "boyar's house." This building is of particular significance, as it likely served as a residence or administrative center of the local aristocracy. Besides it, Djambov discovered other buildings within the fortress, which testifies to a complex and well-organized internal structure.

At the foot of the hill on which the fortress is situated, Djambov also uncovered an outwork, which probably served as shelter for the population and for supporting the fortress. This outwork complements the understanding of the overall organization of the defensive complex and its role in the defense of Velbazhd.

All these architectural and archaeological data provide valuable information about the construction techniques, strategic location, and functionality of the fortified settlement at Velbazhd, which was an important military and administrative center in medieval Bulgaria.

The location of the small town Potuka, associated with the historical events around the Battle of Velbazhd, is the subject of various hypotheses among researchers. The most plausible hypothesis indicates that Potuka was situated on the territory of today's village of Enina. This connection is supported by the presence in the area of Enina of ruins of a medieval fortress known as Chilechito, which is built on a hill with an elevation of 710 meters above sea level. This strategically positioned hill was a key point for controlling the surroundings and the roads leading to important medieval towns.

The fortress Chilechito is described in detail by the archaeologist A. Popov, who notes that it is located in the northeastern part of the village of Enina, between natural landmarks such as Stara River, Tsepenova Mogila, and Dzanov Dol. The territory occupied by the fortress covers an area of about 5 decares (approximately 5,000 square meters), which speaks to its considerable size and importance. Small above-ground remains of a fortress wall with a thickness of 2.5 meters have been preserved, built from rubble stones bonded with white mortar, which testifies to the high quality of construction and the defensive functions of the structure.

In the northern part of the fortress, remains of a battle tower have been uncovered, which served for observation and defensive actions against attackers. Additionally, southeast of the main fortress wall, remains of a second fortress wall have been found, which was supplied with water from a nearby spring called Urumbeevitsa. This second wall had strategic significance as it blocked the road through the Tryavna Pass, leading to Tarnovgrad – the capital of the Second Bulgarian Empire. In this way, the fortress controlled an important trade and military route.

In the area of the village of Enina, there also existed a medieval settlement of an urban type, as evidenced by the discovered medieval coins. These coins suggest that the settlement had economic activity and played a role in regional trade and administration. At the center of this settlement is the church of St. Paraskeva, which is connected with an important historical tradition regarding the transfer of the relics of Saint Paraskeva of Epivates.

According to the tradition, the relics of St. Paraskeva were transferred during the years 1337–1338 in the time of Tsar Ivan Asen II. The procession with the relics spent the night precisely in the village of Enina, at the place where later the church of St. Paraskeva was erected. This event highlights the religious and cultural significance of the settlement in the Middle Ages. The procession traveled along the route from present-day Kazanlak through the village of Enina to the town of Tryavna and from there to Tarnovgrad, passing through the Balkan range via the Tryavna Pass.

There is evidence that this road from Kazanlak through Enina to Tryavna existed already in the Middle Ages, which further confirms the strategic importance of the area. Control over this road and the fortress Chilechito was of key importance for the protection of the capital Tarnovgrad and for ensuring the safe passage of important religious and trade processions. Thus, the settlement Potuka, probably identical with today's village of Enina, and the fortress Chilechito were important elements of the medieval Bulgarian defensive and cultural network.

According to the Byzantine chronicler Kantakouzenos, the small town of Potuka was located at a distance of three passes from the fortress of Kopsis. This geographical location is of key importance for understanding the military movements in the region, as the distance between the village of Enina and the town of Sopot corresponds to that between Potuka and Kopsis, allowing parallels to be drawn and the routes of the army units to be traced.

The troops of the Bulgarian Tsar Michael III Shishman were positioned one pass away from Potuka, placing them in close proximity to the strategic point. At the same time, Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos managed to bring his forces to Potuka, despite the relatively short distance, which demonstrates the determination and speed of the Byzantine army to position itself in the area.

Andronikos III’s troops were stationed north of the Balkan range or within its depths, with this mountain chain representing a reliable barrier between the two opponents. This natural barrier had strategic significance, as it limited the possibilities for a direct clash and required careful planning of military operations.

Emperor Andronikos III left the commander George Vrenios with a force to defend the fortresses of Stanimaka (modern Asenovgrad) and Tsepina (located near the village of Dorkovo). The purpose of this measure was to prevent a possible sortie by the Plovdiv garrison, which could have supported the Bulgarian forces and altered the balance of power in the region.

After moving towards Potuka, Andronikos III encamped near the fortress, thereby securing control over an important strategic point. At this moment, the emperor likely received reports that Voisil, the Bulgarian military commander, had died. However, Kantakouzenos reports that Andronikos III did not believe the first two messengers who brought him this news.

The emperor only believed the third messenger, who was an eyewitness and a Roman (Byzantine) by nationality, which speaks to his caution and distrust of unconfirmed information. There are grounds to think that Andronikos III was deliberately misled regarding Voisil’s death, a tactical manipulation intended to weaken the Byzantine position.

It later turned out that Voisil had poisoned himself with mushrooms but was saved, meaning that he was not only alive but also able to continue commanding the Bulgarian troops. For this reason, Andronikos III did not receive the expected support from Voisil, which consisted of 3,000 men, and this strongly influenced his decision not to advance against the Bulgarian army.

The Bulgarian army was encamped in mountainous terrain, surrounded by deep trenches, which provided additional protection and complicated any potential attacker’s efforts. Moreover, the Bulgarian forces had a large quantity of arrows, which could inflict significant damage in the narrow passes where the enemy’s maneuverability was limited.

As a result of these circumstances, Emperor Andronikos III returned to Adrianople without engaging in a direct clash with the Bulgarian army. Meanwhile, the besieged towns surrendered to Michael III Shishman, which strengthened the Bulgarian tsar’s position in the region.

In the summer of 1323, the Byzantine commander George Vrenios succeeded in capturing Plovdiv, which was an important success for Byzantium but did not substantially change the balance of power in the context of the upcoming Battle of Velbazhd. These events and the disposition of the troops create a complex picture of the military situation immediately before the decisive clash.

After consolidating his positions, Tsar Michael III Shishman turned his attention to the territories of Voysil, who had by then fully recovered and was ready to resist. Voysil was not alone in his defense, as he had the support of the Roman (Byzantine) forces, which complicated the task of the Bulgarian ruler.

Despite the stubborn resistance he offered, Voysil was defeated by Michael III Shishman. After his defeat, he fled to Byzantium, and his domains came under the control of the Tarnovo tsar, which significantly increased Bulgaria's territorial influence.

After the failure of the plans to capture the palace and the unsuccessful diplomatic efforts, Michael III Shishman issued an order to Ivan Rusin to return. Ivan Rusin carried out this order immediately, which demonstrates the discipline and obedience within the Bulgarian ranks, as well as the change in the tactical situation that necessitated the withdrawal of the detachment.

On May 24, 1328, Andronikos III Palaiologos entered Constantinople as a victor, thereby officially ascending to the Byzantine throne. However, this success did not bring lasting peace, as about a month after his accession, new military operations began in Thrace, where tensions between Byzantium and Bulgaria escalated once again.

Michael III Shishman, the Bulgarian tsar, launched an incursion into Thrace, bringing with him Tatar mercenaries, which indicates the seriousness of the military campaign and his desire to strengthen his position in the region. According to the Byzantine chronicler Kantakouzenos, the Bulgarian forces reached the city of Viza, located in Thrace, where Andronikos III also arrived with his troops to confront the invaders.

Before a battle could take place, the Bulgarians withdrew, probably due to Michael III Shishman’s assessment that his forces were insufficient for a direct confrontation with the Byzantine army. This tactical retreat shows that the Bulgarian ruler was aware of the military situation and preferred to preserve his troops for a more favorable moment.

The Byzantine chronicler Gregoras claims that the encounter between the two armies took place near Adrianople and ended with the conclusion of a peace treaty. Nevertheless, this claim is implausible, as military actions continued even after this supposed meeting, indicating that peace negotiations did not lead to a lasting cessation of the conflict.

The initiative in the ongoing military operations was in the hands of the Byzantines, who launched an offensive and succeeded in storming the fortress of Diampol, present-day Yambol. After capturing it, the Byzantine troops destroyed Diampol, which is a clear sign of an attempt to weaken the Bulgarian defensive line and demoralize the population. Following the destruction of the fortress, the Byzantines withdrew, likely due to strategic considerations or insufficient forces to hold the positions.

Two months later, Michael III Shishman again invaded Eastern Thrace, this time plundering the fortress of Vukelon, located near the village of Matochina in the Svilengrad region. The old name of the village is Fikel, and the fortress of Vukelon is situated on a hill north of the village, which has steep rocky slopes on the northern side and is accessible only from the south. This hill occupies a commanding position over the surrounding area and provides a good overview, making it a strategically important point for controlling the valley of the Tundzha River.

The fortress of Vukelon is part of a system of fortresses that block the Tundzha valley, serving to protect the region from invasions and to control the roads. Only faint traces remain of the fortress walls, but its dimensions are known—approximately 200 meters in length and about 65 meters in width. The wall is constructed of rubble stone bonded with white mortar and brick belts, characteristic of late antique construction, confirming that this is indeed the fortress of Vukelon.

Particularly impressive is the preserved imposing tower of the fortress, which is over 20 meters high and has three floors. It is built of rubble stone bonded with white mortar, and its upper part features battlements typical of defensive structures from this period. The tower is an inner defensive tower, known as a donjon, and served not only for military defense but also as the residence of the feudal lord, emphasizing its importance as a center of power and control in the region.

In June 1330, Michael III Shishman, the Bulgarian tsar, undertakes a decisive military campaign, which begins from the capital Tarnovgrad. On June 19, he leads his troops and proceeds along the valley of the Struma River, passing through Sredets, present-day Sofia. This route is strategically important as it provides quick and secure access to key fortresses in the region. Among them, the fortress of Zemen holds particular significance, located in the gorge of the Struma River, on its right bank, south of the present-day village of Zemen. Michael III Shishman manages to capture this fortress, which is an important success for the Bulgarian army and strengthens their positions in the area.

On the eve of the decisive Battle of Velbazhd, the Serbian King Stefan Uroš III Dečanski concentrated his forces in the strategic area of Toplica, located between the mouth of the Toplica River and the Morava River. This position allowed him to control important routes and to monitor possible enemy movements. The Serbian army included mercenary Catalan detachments, which supplemented the main forces and provided additional combat power and tactical variety to the Serbian troops.

Stefan Uroš III assumed that the Bulgarian forces would advance towards Niš, which led him to deploy his troops in Toplica in order to meet them there. At the same time, the Bulgarian Tsar Michael III Shishman directed his troops along the valley of the Struma River, aiming to be closer to the Byzantine (Roman) forces in the vicinity of Bitola. This position gave him a strategic advantage for potential actions against Byzantium but also distanced him from the presumed Serbian front.

In response to these movements, Stefan Uroš III transferred his troops from the Morava River valley to the valley of the Pčinja River, a tactical decision for better positioning and preparation for the upcoming clash. For support and spiritual protection, the Serbian king stopped at the Nagorič monastery near the village of Staro Nagoričino, close to Kumanovo, where according to Serbian sources he received blessings and support for the forthcoming actions.

After his stay at the monastery, Stefan Uroš III continued his march towards present-day Kriva Palanka, and then, after a new prayer at the monastery of Saint Naum of Ohrid, reached the village of Kamenichko, near present-day Kyustendil. On July 24, 1330, he established his camp precisely at this village, which proved to be a key location for the upcoming battle.

The two armies met near Velbazhd, present-day Kyustendil, with both sides having approximately equal numbers of soldiers. Michael III Shishman’s Bulgarian army included about 12,000 Bulgarians and another 3,000 people from other ethnic groups. Among these other groups were Vlach detachments led by Ivan Besaraba and his son Alexander, as well as mercenary Tatars and Yasi (Alans), who added additional combat strength and diversity to the Bulgarian army.

On the other hand, the Serbian army of Stefan Uroš III Dečanski consisted of 14,000 Serbs and 1,000 Catalan mercenaries. Command of this army was entrusted to the king’s son, Stefan Dušan, who was tasked with leading the combat operations and securing victory for the Serbian forces.

Before the battle began, negotiations took place between Stefan Uroš III and Michael III Shishman, which ended with an agreement for a one-day truce. This pause was a strategic move by the Serbian king, who sought to buy time to await delayed Serbian detachments and to strengthen his positions.

Michael III Shishman, for his part, decided to use the lull to procure provisions and other necessary resources for his army. To this end, he sent a special military unit to secure supplies and prepare the army for the forthcoming clash. These actions demonstrate that both commanders understood the importance of time and resources in preparing for the decisive Battle of Velbazhd.

After the battle, the body of Michael III Shishman was brought to the Serbian king who, according to the sources, wept over the corpse of his son-in-law. Despite the hostile relations, the king ordered that the Bulgarian tsar be buried with honors in the Church of St. George near the village of Staro Nagoričino in the Kumanovo region. The archaeologist Y. Ivanov later discovered in this church a tombstone with a partially erased inscription, which is believed to have been placed on the grave of the tragically fallen Bulgarian ruler.

Michael III Shishman died three days after his capture, leaving behind a legacy of heroism and tragedy in Bulgarian history.

During the course of the battle of Velbazhd, a dramatic and fateful moment unfolds involving the heir to the Serbian throne, Stefan Dušan. According to his own claims, he personally cut off the head of the Bulgarian tsar Michael III Shishman with his sword. This bold and brutal act did not go unnoticed in popular memory and was immortalized in a Serbian folk song, which conveys the heroic image of Dušan and his role in the demise of the Bulgarian ruler.

Apart from oral tradition, the killing of Michael III Shishman is also attributed to Stefan Dušan in another Serbian source from the 15th century. This source reveals a more complex picture of the events, indicating that the two rulers – Stefan Dušan and Michael III Shishman – initially conducted successful negotiations and decided not to shed blood. This fact testifies to intentions of peace and mutual understanding between the two sides, which, however, was violated.

The reason for the breach of the truce lies in the actions of the heir, who, without the knowledge and against the will of his father, King Stefan Uroš III Dečanski, launched a sudden attack against the Bulgarian army. This unexpected and unauthorized assault led to the defeat of the Bulgarian forces and the capture of Tsar Michael III Shishman. This move by Stefan Dušan was crucial for the outcome of the battle and changed the course of events in the region.

The reaction of the king, Stefan Uroš III Dečanski, was firm and condemnatory. He did not approve of his son's deed and reproached him for breaking the agreed truce. At the same time, the king showed great respect towards the captured Bulgarian ruler, receiving him with honors and ordering that he be buried with dignity after his death. This reaction highlights the moral and political differences between father and son, as well as the complexity of relations within the Serbian ruling dynasty.

The author of this account, the Serbian Michael of Ostrovica, expresses condemnation of the heir’s treachery. He emphasizes that it was Stefan Dušan who initiated the breach of the truce, casting a shadow over his image and actions. Furthermore, historical sources note that later Stefan Dušan became the murderer of his own father, which further complicates his historical persona and legacy.

Serbian sources also contain the claim that during the battle the Serbian forces were divided into two detachments – one under the command of King Stefan Uroš III Dečanski, and the other under his son Stefan Dušan. However, this claim is questioned, since at that time the king was half-blind and physically incapable of actively commanding his troops. This fact shows that the source data are scarce and contradictory, making an accurate reconstruction of the events difficult.

To complement and clarify these contradictions, there exists a tradition recorded by Georgi Katsarov from the village of Shishkovtsi. He heard it from his father, Pene Katsarov, which lends authenticity and depth to the narrative. The content of this tradition finds full confirmation in the topographical and hydrographical characteristics of the battlefield, which contributes to a better understanding of the course of the battle and the role of the individual participants in it.

The first encounter between the Bulgarian and Serbian forces during the Battle of Velbazhd took place in the area of the village of Kopilovtsi. Here, the Serbian forces managed to occupy a strategic height near the village, from which they began to harass the Bulgarians with spears. This position gave them an advantage, as from the height they could strike downwards at the Bulgarian ranks. Despite this, the Bulgarians succeeded in repelling the Serbs from this position, demonstrating their determination and combat readiness in this initial stage of the conflict.

After this initial clash, the two sides decided to negotiate a truce. These negotiations led to the conclusion of a temporary ceasefire between the Bulgarians and Serbs, which allowed the Serbs to withdraw from their positions. Following the Serbian troops' retreat, the Bulgarian forces set up camp in the valley of the Dragovishtitsa River, a tributary of the Struma River. The area around the camp was known as Shishmanitsa, likely named after the Bulgarian Tsar Michael III Shishman, who commanded the troops.

Michael III Shishman's camp was located near a spring known as Geranya. In front of the Bulgarian camp stretched marshlands which, according to the memories of the elderly inhabitants of the village of Shishkovtsi, provided some protection to the Bulgarian camp from enemy forces. These marshes, although now drained, served as a natural barrier that hindered the enemy's approach. The Bulgarian army's supply wagons were stationed in the area of the village of Dvorishta, which was strategically important for provisioning the army.

On the day of the truce, the Bulgarians sent detachments to the village of Stensko to procure fodder for the troops. In this village stood the fortress of Gorna Sateka, whose remains can still be seen today. This fortress likely served as an important point for control and defense of the region.

Despite the truce, the Serbian forces launched a sudden attack against the Bulgarians from the heights in the area of the village of Shishkovtsi. These heights provided the Serbs with the opportunity for a concealed approach, which took the Bulgarians by surprise. The Bulgarian troops resisted in the locality of Bozhuritsa, situated between the villages of Shishkovtsi and Spasovitsa. According to tradition, from the blood of the fallen Bulgarian soldiers in this area many peonies blossomed, giving symbolic significance to this place.

Despite the resistance, the Bulgarians were caught off guard and unprepared during the assault, which led to their defeat in the battle. During the fighting, Tsar Michael III Shishman was wounded, further weakening the Bulgarian forces. After the defeat, the Serbs pursued the retreating Bulgarian troops through the Konyavski Pass, capturing the fortress near the village of Izvor. Following this success, the Serbs halted their advance, likely to consolidate their positions.

Despite the initial Serbian success, the Bulgarian forces, commanded by the Vidin despot Belaur, brother of Michael III Shishman, managed to defeat the Serbs. Belaur arrived to assist from Vidin and succeeded in turning the tide of the battle. This engagement took place on Spasovden (Ascension Day), which is of particular significance, as the Serbs erected a chapel on the height now known as Sveti Spas (Holy Savior) in honor of the saint who, according to them, helped them achieve victory. This chapel symbolizes the religious and moral support the Serbs sought and received at this critical moment of the battle.

In the tradition, which includes many completely reliable details, it is stated that the first battle between the Bulgarian and Serbian armies during the Battle of Velbazhd likely took place in the vicinity of the village of Kopilovtsi. This village is situated in the valley of the Struma River, not far from the place where the Dragovishtitsa River flows into it. This location is of great importance, as the Struma valley represents a natural route for the movement of troops in this region.

The decisive battle of Velbazhd took place in the Mraka area, located north of the Konyavski Pass. This strategic position was chosen to intercept the advancing Serbian troops, who were heading towards Bulgarian lands. The forces of the Vidin despot Belaur played a key role in this operation, confronting the Serbian forces precisely in the Mraka area. In addition to them, the troops of the Lovech despot Alexander, as well as other boyars, participated in the interception, contributing to the overall Bulgarian defensive strategy.

After the encounter in the Mraka area, the Serbian ruler decided to abandon his intention to conquer Bulgaria. This refusal was not solely the result of the appearance of new Bulgarian troops, as is sometimes assumed, but rather was caused by fear inspired by the strength and organization of the Bulgarian forces, as well as by diplomatic concessions made by the Bulgarian side. An important factor in the Serbian ruler's decision was also a defeat mentioned in tradition, which seriously undermined his ambitions for conquests. Interestingly, this defeat was omitted by the Serbian hagiographer Bishop Danilo, who aimed to glorify the Serbian kings and present their actions in a more favorable light.

Danilo's work contains some errors that have gone unnoticed by researchers. He claims that the Bulgarian troops, led by Michael III Shishman, moved from Tarnovgrad towards Vidin, and from there towards Sredets (Sofia). However, this claim is implausible and does not correspond to the actual military movements. The more accurate information concerns the troops commanded by Belaur, who set out from Vidin towards the Struma River valley. This route was strategically chosen to intercept the Serbian forces.

The shortest path from Vidin to Velbazhd passes through Sredets and the Konyavski Pass. At the northern exit of the Konyavski Pass is the fortress of Izvor, which was an important military point. The Serbian troops advanced towards Sredets precisely through the Konyavski Pass and managed to capture the fortress of Izvor. After taking control of this fortress, they penetrated into the Mraka area, located north of Izvor, where the decisive battle followed.

The reverse movement, indicated in Danilo's source and in some later publications, is incorrect and does not correspond to historical reality. The date of the decisive battle, mentioned in the tradition, coincides with data from other sources, which confirms the reliability of the described events.

On the height of St. Spas, where the battle took place, there was a church of the same name. The ruins of the St. Spas church were preserved until the beginning of the 20th century, which testifies to the historical significance of this place and its lasting importance in Bulgarian history. This church probably served as a landmark and spiritual symbol for the participants in the battle and for the local population.

During the course of the battle of Velbazhd, Tsar Michael III Shishman was wounded, which proved to be fateful for his life and for the course of events. According to tradition, after receiving the severe wound, he headed towards Velbazhd, probably hoping to find refuge or help. However, on the way, in the village of Konyavo, his horse died, which hindered his movement and underscored his grave condition. This loss of the horse is symbolic of the fall of the tsar and his power.

In the village of Bagrenitsa, during his continued movement towards Velbazhd, Michael III Shishman's royal mantle slipped down from his bald head — a symbol of his royal authority and dignity. This detail from the tradition emphasizes the drama of the situation and the gradual stripping away of his royal strength and authority. Despite all difficulties, Michael III Shishman managed to reach Velbazhd, where, however, he died from the wound inflicted during the battle. This death marks the end of an important period in Bulgarian history and leaves a deep mark in the national memory.

After his death, Tsar Michael III Shishman was buried in the Church of St. George in the village of Kolusha, which today is a district of Kyustendil. This church was an important religious and cultural center, and its ruins existed until the beginning of the 20th century. Later, a new church with the same name was built on the same site, demonstrating the continuing significance of this place for the local population and for Bulgarian history.

An interesting fact is that the sources do not mention the role of the fortress Velbazhd during the military actions. Nevertheless, on the hill Hisarlaka above present-day Kyustendil rises the citadel of the fortress Velbazhd, which represents the acropolis of the ancient Pautalia. This acropolis was also used during the Middle Ages, and its ruins are known to the local population as Kostadinovo Kale. The name comes from the feudal ruler Constantine, who governed Velbazhd during the second half of the 14th century.

The fortress Velbazhd is strategically important, as it blocks the road from Sredets (Sofia) to Skopje, making it a key point for control over the region. According to tradition, the fortress remained in Bulgarian hands after the battle, and Serbian authors do not mention its capture. This suggests that the fortress was not taken by the Serbs, which is an important detail for understanding the results of the conflict.

After the defeat of the Serbian troops in the area of Mraka, negotiations began between the two sides. In these negotiations, the Serbs did not make territorial claims, which is unusual for such a conflict and speaks to their weakness and loss of initiative. Instead, they sought to place their protégé on the Bulgarian throne, which confirms the accounts from tradition about the failure of the Serbs and their inability to impose direct rule.

These events also testify to the high combat capability of the Bulgarian troops, who were under the command of Belaur. This military strength and skillful leadership were key factors for the Bulgarians' success in the battle and for preserving the territorial integrity of the country. Ultimately, the battle of Velbazhd and the subsequent events shaped a new phase in the relations between Bulgaria and Serbia, highlighting the importance of the fortress Velbazhd and the role of Tsar Michael III Shishman in Bulgarian history.

After the Battle of Velbazhd, which proved decisive for the fate of the Bulgarian state, Ivan-Stefan was placed on the Bulgarian throne. He was the son of Michael III Shishman and his first wife Anna, who was Serbian by origin. This family connection gave the Serbian side reason to hope that through Ivan-Stefan they would succeed in strengthening their political influence in Bulgaria, using him as a kind of bridge for influence and control over Bulgarian affairs.

Despite these hopes, at the beginning of 1331 a domestic conflict broke out in Bulgaria, manifested through a palace coup carried out by dissatisfied Bulgarian boyars. These influential aristocrats were unhappy with the rule of Ivan-Stefan and his mother Anna, likely due to concerns about Serbian influence and the loss of their own positions and power. As a result of the coup, Ivan-Stefan and his mother were forced to leave the country, thus temporarily thwarting Serbian ambitions for control over Bulgaria.

In place of Ivan-Stefan on the Tarnovo throne was installed Despot Ivan Alexander, who was a nephew of Michael III Shishman. Ivan Alexander was one of the prominent boyars in the country, which ensured him broad support among the aristocracy and stability in governance. This change of power marked a new stage in Bulgarian history, initiating the rule of Ivan Alexander’s dynasty, which would play a key role in the coming years.

Thus, after the Battle of Velbazhd and the subsequent events, the political scene in Bulgaria changed fundamentally. The Serbs, who had hoped to use Ivan-Stefan as an instrument of influence, lost this opportunity, while the Bulgarian boyars managed to restore control over the throne through their representative Ivan Alexander. This period was marked by internal struggles and changes that had a profound impact on the future of the Bulgarian state.