Judge

The term “judge” belongs to the same Slavic word family as “court” or “judgment” and the verb “to judge.” The protective clause of the Rila Charter—the section barring officials from violating the privileges granted by the ruler—mentions “сѫдїе,” or judges. The Rila Charter, the Mraka Chrysobull, and the Virgino Chrysobull also use words for a court or adjudication, while the Virgino document contains “сѫдница,” meaning a place of judgment, and the verb “сѫдити,” “to judge.” A chrysobull was a solemn ruler’s charter authenticated with a gold seal. These attestations establish the presence of judges, places of judgment, and judicial procedures, but they do not reveal the organization of the office.

Not every medieval occurrence of the word provides evidence for a state institution. Some examples refer to the Last Judgment, while biblical and literary translations merely demonstrate the currency of the term. The expression “great judge” in a Slavonic text from Zograph presents a similar problem. Its Greek original dates from 1290, but the translation was made only in the sixteenth century, and the expression is a loose rendering of the Greek title “τὸν μέγαν εὐδομιαστήν.” It therefore does not demonstrate that a Bulgarian office called “great judge” existed. Nor is any individual securely attested by name as a judge of the Second Bulgarian Empire.

Legislation from the First Bulgarian Empire provides additional comparative evidence. The Slavonic Ecloga and the Law for Judging the People contain rules on investigation, witness testimony, and the activity of the prince and the judge. In this context, “prince” need not mean the sovereign; it may also designate a local lord or governor. These texts reflect the expansion of state adjudication at the expense of blood vengeance, tribal courts, and private retaliation. There is no direct evidence, however, that these collections remained continuously in force during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, so they can be used only for comparison.

The Byzantine background is clearest in legal models rather than in the demonstrable transplantation of a single Constantinopolitan office. The Syntagma of Matthew Blastares, compiled in the first half of the fourteenth century, was connected with Byzantine efforts to centralize adjudication, reduce overlapping jurisdictions, and enlarge the Church’s role in legal proceedings. These reforms produced general, or universal, judges, who are also attested in the Serres state of Despot John Ugljesa. The existence of a Slavonic translation of the Syntagma is not sufficient to prove that Bulgaria adopted the same institution. The Serres state was far closer to the Byzantine administrative system, while such a reform would also have required specially trained personnel.

Serbian treaties with Dubrovnik offer more detailed comparative material, regulating jurisdiction and the composition of tribunals in disputes between Serbs and Ragusan merchants. Bulgarian documents contain no equally elaborate arrangements. The treaty of Tsar Michael II Asen with Ragusa provided that a Bulgarian merchant involved in a dispute with a Ragusan was to receive justice without court expenses or a judicial tax, on a reciprocal basis. This clause shows that legal fees were significant enough to be addressed in an international agreement. It also suggests that jurisdiction depended on authority over the territory concerned. There is no direct evidence for mixed Bulgarian-Ragusan tribunals, although their existence cannot be ruled out entirely.

A Serbian charter issued by King Stefan Uroš II Milutin in 1300 distinguishes “great and lesser judges,” city judges, and judges of the župa, or territorial district. A comparable internal division may have existed in Bulgaria, but it is not attested. Bulgarian charters do not reveal whether judges were arranged in successive levels of appeal or whether official categories corresponding to the Serbian ones existed. All that can be established securely is that several judges could operate at the same time and that the ruler’s court stood above local adjudication.

The Law Code of Stefan Dušan must likewise be used with caution. It regulates summonses, jurisdiction, enforcement of judgments, and the assistance that public authorities and private persons were required to provide. Assaulting or publicly dishonouring a judge was punishable, while magistrates were forbidden to take benefits from the population. The code placed law above the ruler’s personal will: even the tsar and his family could be summoned, and the judge was to decide without fear of him. These provisions do not directly prove Bulgarian practice, but the shared Byzantine legal inheritance makes similar principles plausible.

The Second Bulgarian Empire had no modern separation between judicial, executive, and administrative authority. Many officials could decide disputes arising within the sphere of their duties. At the same time, the official specifically called a judge probably exercised broader powers than a modern judge. Comparative legal texts associate the magistrate with collecting fines, arranging enforcement, preserving copies of decisions, and obtaining assistance from other authorities. The Law for Judging the People even presents the judge as personally carrying out corporal punishment and banishment. Although this evidence does not come directly from thirteenth- or fourteenth-century Bulgaria, it points to a combination of judicial, policing, fiscal, and enforcement responsibilities.

There is no evidence for the precise method of appointment. The office’s authority and public character suggest appointment by the ruler or another senior representative of government, but this remains an inference. Each judge probably acted within a defined area, although its boundaries and relationship to the territories of other officials are unknown. The judge’s position in the court or administrative hierarchy also cannot be reconstructed securely. No distinctive insignia, seals, or coins are known, and no specific individual can be identified beyond doubt as a holder of the office.

In the later period, rulers’ grants restricted the authority of ordinary judges over certain monastic estates and their dependent populations. Adjudication within such lands passed to the relevant monastic or privileged authorities, while ordinary judges could be forbidden even to enter them. This did not remove all state supervision, since higher officials such as the kephale—a governor of a town or province—retained certain powers. The sources attest judges in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but they do not show when the office was introduced or when it disappeared.

The word “judge” comes from the same Slavic word family as “court,” “judgment,” and the verb “to judge.” In the protective clause of the Rila Charter—the part that forbids officials from breaking the ruler’s granted privileges—the word “сѫдїе,” meaning judges, appears. The Rila Charter, the Mraka Chrysobull, and the Virgino Chrysobull also use words for a court or for judging. The Virgino document goes further, with “сѫдница,” meaning a place of judgment, and the verb “сѫдити,” “to judge.” A chrysobull was a formal ruler’s charter sealed with gold. These references show that judges, places for judgment, and legal procedures existed, but they do not tell us how the office itself was organized.

Not every medieval use of the word is proof of a state office. Some examples refer to the Last Judgment. In biblical and literary translations, the word simply shows that the term was in use. The phrase “great judge” in a Slavonic text from Zograph raises the same issue. Its Greek source dates from 1290, but the translation was made only in the sixteenth century. The phrase is also a loose rendering of the Greek title “τὸν μέγαν εὐδομιαστήν.” For that reason, it does not prove that a Bulgarian office called “great judge” existed. Nor is there any securely named individual who can be identified as a judge of the Second Bulgarian Empire.

The legislation of the First Bulgarian Empire gives useful comparison. The Slavonic Ecloga and the Law for Judging the People include rules about investigations, witness testimony, and the work of the prince and the judge. Here, “prince” does not have to mean the sovereign; it may also mean a local lord or governor. These texts show the growth of state-led justice at the expense of blood vengeance, tribal courts, and private retaliation. Even so, there is no direct evidence that these law codes stayed in force without interruption during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, so they can be used only as comparisons.

The Byzantine background is clearest in legal models, not in proof that one specific office from Constantinople was copied directly. The Syntagma of Matthew Blastares, put together in the first half of the fourteenth century, was linked to Byzantine attempts to bring judgment under tighter central control, limit overlapping courts, and expand the Church’s role in legal matters. Out of these reforms came general, or universal, judges. They are also known from the Serres state of Despot John Ugljesa. The fact that a Slavonic translation of the Syntagma existed does not prove that Bulgaria adopted the same system. The Serres state stood much closer to the Byzantine administrative order, and such a reform would also have needed specially trained people.

Serbian treaties with Dubrovnik provide more detailed comparison. They set out rules on jurisdiction and on how courts should be formed in disputes between Serbs and Ragusan merchants. Bulgarian documents do not contain anything as detailed. The treaty of Tsar Michael II Asen with Ragusa said that a Bulgarian merchant in a dispute with a Ragusan was to get justice without court expenses or a judicial tax, and the same rule worked both ways. This clause shows that legal fees were important enough to be discussed in an international treaty. It also suggests that jurisdiction depended on who held authority in the territory in question. There is no direct proof of mixed Bulgarian-Ragusan tribunals, though they cannot be ruled out completely.

A Serbian charter issued by King Stefan Uroš II Milutin in 1300 makes a distinction between “great and lesser judges,” city judges, and judges of the župa, meaning a territorial district. Bulgaria may have had a similar internal division, but there is no proof of it. Bulgarian charters do not show whether judges formed a ladder of appeals or whether there were official categories like the Serbian ones. The only thing that can be said with confidence is that several judges could work at the same time and that the ruler’s court stood above local judgment.

The Law Code of Stefan Dušan also has to be handled carefully. It deals with summonses, jurisdiction, enforcement of judgments, and the help that public authorities and private people had to give. Anyone who attacked or publicly insulted a judge could be punished, and officials were not allowed to take benefits from the people. The code also put law above the ruler’s personal wishes: even the tsar and his family could be summoned, and the judge was to decide without fear of him. These rules do not directly prove how Bulgaria worked, but the shared Byzantine legal heritage makes similar ideas believable.

The Second Bulgarian Empire did not have the modern split between judicial, executive, and administrative power. Many officials could settle disputes that came up in the area they supervised. At the same time, the man specifically called a judge probably had wider powers than a modern judge. Comparative legal texts link the magistrate with collecting fines, organizing enforcement, keeping copies of decisions, and getting help from other authorities. The Law for Judging the People even shows the judge personally carrying out corporal punishment and banishment. This evidence does not come directly from thirteenth- or fourteenth-century Bulgaria, but it points to a mix of judging, policing, financial, and enforcement duties.

We have no evidence for exactly how judges were chosen. The office’s authority and public role suggest that the ruler, or another senior government figure, appointed them, but that is still only an inference. Each judge probably worked within a certain area, although we do not know its borders or how it related to the areas of other officials. We also cannot securely reconstruct the judge’s place in the court or administrative hierarchy. No special insignia, seals, or coins are known, and no individual can be identified beyond doubt as a holder of the office.

In the later period, rulers’ grants limited what ordinary judges could do on certain monastic estates and among the people who depended on them. Within those lands, authority over judgment passed to the relevant monastic or privileged officials, and ordinary judges could even be barred from entering. This did not end all state oversight, since higher officials such as the kephale—a governor of a town or province—still kept some powers. The sources show judges in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but they do not tell us when the office began or when it ended.

Charters from the 13th and 14th centuries show that judges did exist in the Second Bulgarian Empire. The Rila Charter, the Mraka charter, and the Virgino charter mention judges, courts, and judgment. This proves that legal work was being done, but not how the office was set up.

The sources do not clearly show any one person as a judge, or a fixed rank system of judges. Some words in old church books may only mean “judgment” in a religious sense, not a real state office. So the evidence for the office itself is limited.

Other law texts from Bulgaria, Byzantium, and Serbia help fill in the picture. They show judges dealing with trials, witnesses, fines, punishment, and help from other officials. This suggests that a judge was more than just a courtroom man. He could also help carry out decisions and keep order.

The main point is that judges were part of state rule in medieval Bulgaria, but we do not know the full shape of the office. We do know that rulers could limit a judge’s power, especially on monastery lands. The office was important, but its exact beginning, end, and place in the system are still unclear.