Battle of Tryavna

After the restoration of the Bulgarian state under the rule of the Asen dynasty, the country managed to strengthen its position in the region by exploiting the military-political instability engulfing Byzantium. This instability was caused by Byzantium's conflict with the crusaders of the Third Crusade, who in 1189 passed through the Balkan lands on their way to the Holy Land.

The leader of the crusader army was the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who led the German knights through the territories of the Balkan Peninsula. In July 1189, the army settled for some time near the city of Niš, a strategic location that allowed the crusaders to prepare for the next stages of their campaign.

At that moment, the Serbian Grand Župan Stefan Nemanja arrived in Niš, offering military assistance to the crusaders. His goal was to use the opportunity for territorial gains by joining the conflict on the side of the crusaders against Byzantium. This move demonstrated the complex political maneuvering of the Balkan rulers, who sought to benefit from the major Western military campaigns.

At the same time, Bulgarian envoys also arrived in Niš, offering Frederick I Barbarossa military support against Byzantium. This move by the Bulgarians was a strategic attempt to take advantage of the situation and weaken Byzantine authority in the region. However, the emperor was unwilling to enter into open war with Byzantium and gave evasive answers to the proposals for cooperation.

After their stay in Niš, the crusaders continued their journey toward Constantinople, settling at the end of August 1189 in Plovdiv. Upon the crusaders' arrival, the city was abandoned by its inhabitants, who likely feared violence and looting. The crusaders behaved as open enemies of Byzantium, which was evident in their actions toward the local population.

In Thrace, the crusaders fought with weapons against resisting residents and plundered them, demonstrating their aggressive policy and desire for quick gains. They succeeded in capturing several cities to the southeast, among which were Beroea, present-day Stara Zagora, and Constantia, located near modern Simeonovgrad.

In November 1189, the crusader army entered Adrianople (Edirne), an important strategic point on the road to Constantinople. This stage of the campaign underscored the seriousness of the threat the crusaders posed to Byzantium and the Balkan rulers, as well as the complex political situation in the region at that time.

By the year 1190, the conflict between the Byzantine Empire and the Bulgarian lands had significantly escalated, with tensions reaching a critical point. The possibility of Constantinople being captured by the Crusaders passing through the Balkans troubled the Byzantine rulers and prompted them to take diplomatic and military measures. In this context, the Bulgarian ruler sent new envoys to the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who at that time was staying in Adrianople (Odrin). The envoys promised that the Bulgarians could provide an army of 40,000 soldiers to join the fight against Byzantium, hoping to strengthen the alliance with the Crusaders and enhance their position in the region.

The German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa showed a willingness to start a war against the Byzantine Empire but gave an evasive response to the Bulgarian envoys, demonstrating his caution and strategic consideration of the situation. Nevertheless, in 1190 a treaty was signed between the Crusaders and the Constantinopolitan rulers, which provided for the Byzantines to supply ships for the transport of the Crusader army. This arrangement allowed the Crusaders to cross by ship to Asia Minor, from where they continued their campaign towards Cilicia, thus leaving the Balkan Peninsula.

After the Crusaders withdrew from the Balkans, the Byzantine Emperor Isaac II Angelos decided to undertake military actions against the Serbs and Bulgarians, using as a pretext claims that they supported Frederick I Barbarossa. Initially, the Byzantine forces directed their efforts against the Serbs and inflicted a heavy defeat on them near Niš, close to the Morava River, which temporarily stabilized the Byzantine position in the region.

During this period, Tsar Asen I ruled Bulgaria (1188–1195), and the battle in the Tryavna Pass took place precisely during the wars under his reign. In the spring of 1190, Isaac II Angelos began a campaign against the Bulgarian lands after concluding military actions against the Serbs. According to the Byzantine chronicler Theodore Skoutariotes, the cause of the war lay in the poor condition of the empire’s western provinces, as the Bulgarians, together with the Cumans, were devastating Thrace, which was under Roman (Byzantine) control.

In the winter of the same year, Isaac II Angelos sent the general Constantine Aspietes to conduct military operations against the Bulgarians, but he failed to accomplish the assigned task. As punishment, the basileus blinded Constantine Aspietes, demonstrating his severity and determination to restore Byzantine authority. Following this failure, Isaac II Angelos personally took command of a large army, hoping by the force of arms to regain control over the liberated Bulgarian lands and to restore Roman (Byzantine) rule in the region.

In 1190, the Byzantine army, led by Emperor Isaac II Angelos, undertook a campaign towards Moesia, moving along the seacoast. Along the way, the army passed through important port cities such as Anchialus, present-day Pomorie, and Mesembria, modern Nesebar. This route was chosen to ensure supply and support from the sea, as well as to avoid the more difficult mountainous areas. After passing these cities, the army entered through some of the eastern passes of the Balkan range (Stara Planina), penetrating into northern Bulgaria, which was a strategic move to reach the heart of the Bulgarian lands.

In the third volume of "History of Bulgaria," it is noted that the Byzantine troops entered the Balkan range, which marked the beginning of a key battle in a narrow mountain pass. Here, the Bulgarian forces launched a sudden attack against the Byzantines, who were vulnerable in the confined space of the pass. Despite this, the Byzantines managed to escape complete destruction, albeit with heavy losses, and the emperor himself barely succeeded in reaching the fortress of Boruy, which testifies to the severity of the defeat and the chaos within the ranks of the Byzantine army.

The historian P. Petrov, author of "The Restoration of the Bulgarian State" (Sofia, 1985), examines this battle between Bulgarians and Byzantines in detail. Despite the detailed description, Petrov does not offer his own analyses or conclusions regarding the course of the battle, nor does he connect the accounts of the Byzantine chroniclers with the specific locality where the fighting took place. His description remains abstract and does not allow for tracing the dynamics of the military maneuvers, nor for assessing the high combat skill of the Bulgarian troops, which was key to their success.

Petrov emphasizes that a scholarly description of such a battle must be preceded by a thorough study of the battlefield. He notes that the existing geographic and topographic maps lack sufficient topographical and hydrographical details that would help to more precisely locate and understand the combat actions. Furthermore, the maps are missing important data such as coin and other archaeological finds, as well as information from local traditions that could shed light on the events.

The indication that the battle took place in the spring of 1190 in the Tryavna Pass proves insufficient for a full understanding of the events. The Tryavna Pass is over 40 kilometers long, while the length of the routed Byzantine marching column could not have exceeded 8-9 kilometers, which necessitates a more precise determination of the battle site.

Petrov refers to V. Zlatarski, who also claims that the battle occurred in the Tryavna Pass. According to Petrov, the route of the Byzantine army's retreat from Tarnovo passed southwest of Dryanovo. The Byzantines withdrew along the valley of the Dryanovo River towards Tryavna, where the catastrophic battle for them took place.

After the defeat, the Byzantine army continued from Tryavna through Krustets and descended into the Tulovo field. From there, the army passed through the Zmeevski Pass of the Sredna Gora range and reached Stara Zagora, where it likely attempted to regroup and restore its forces.

An interesting fact is that near Tryavna there is no defile with rocks and stones on both sides, as reported by the Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates. This contradiction shows that the descriptions of the Byzantine authors do not fully correspond to the actual geography of the area. Moreover, the road through Krustets leads to Maglizh and Dabovo, not to Krun as the Byzantine sources claim, which further complicates the reconstruction of the march and the battle.

These details highlight the need for more in-depth research and field studies to clarify the exact development of the battle and to assess the role of the Bulgarian troops in the defeat of the Byzantine army at this key moment in Bulgarian history.

V. Avramov is one of the researchers who have undertaken the study of the battle in the Tryavna Pass, having personally visited the presumed site of the engagement to gather data and construct his hypothesis. Despite his efforts, his analysis contains several significant errors that call into question the reliability of his conclusions and render his overall hypothesis untenable.

One of V. Avramov’s main theses is that the Byzantine army was not besieging Tarnovo, which aligns with indisputable historical evidence. This finding is important because it excludes the possibility of a long and exhausting siege of the capital of the Second Bulgarian Empire, which would have altered the dynamics of the military operations. Instead, Avramov claims that the Byzantines were besieging the fortress of Strinava, which he locates on the plateau southeast of the Dryanovo Monastery. However, this location is not supported by other sources and remains disputed.

V. Avramov also assumes that the Byzantine army was exceptionally large—around 80,000 men. This figure is unfounded and not supported by contemporary sources, which generally provide more moderate estimates of troop numbers for this period. The exaggeration of the army’s size leads to a distorted understanding of the tactical and strategic decisions made during the campaign.

According to Avramov, the catastrophic defeat of the Byzantine army occurred when it was stretched out in a marching column extending from present-day Tryavna to the area of Mount Mukhchenitsa. The distance between these two points is about 14 kilometers, which implies a significant dispersal of forces and vulnerability to sudden attacks. The marching column moved along a route passing beneath the peaks of Golyama Kalimyavka and Malka Kalimyavka, then followed the valley of the Enchovska River toward Mount Mukhchenitsa. The purpose of this movement was to join the Beroe (Vereya) road, which runs along the mountain ridges and is strategically important for troop movements.

However, studies of the road to the present-day village of Enchovtsi show that the area does not offer conditions suitable for a surprise attack and encirclement of the enemy. The ridges on both sides of the Enchovska River are neither rocky nor covered with stones, which contradicts the descriptions of the Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates. He explicitly mentions that the ridges are rocky and covered with stones, which would have been ideal terrain for an ambush and sudden attack. This discrepancy casts doubt on the accuracy of the battle’s localization according to Avramov.

Furthermore, Byzantine authors report that after the lifting of the siege of Tarnovo, the Byzantine army proceeded toward the fortress of Krun, located near the present-day village of Krun, by the shortest route. From there, the army reached Beroe, today’s Stara Zagora. These accounts support the thesis that the field battle should be sought precisely in the Tryavna Pass, rather than in the area around the Dryanovo Monastery or Strinava, as V. Avramov suggests.

In conclusion, although V. Avramov made considerable efforts to investigate the battle site and develop his hypothesis, his errors and inconsistencies in the description of the terrain, the size of the army, and the movement of the troops render his version untenable. It is more likely that the battle took place in the Tryavna Pass, according to the accounts of the Byzantine chroniclers and the geographical features of the area.

A key figure in the investigation of the route taken by the imperial Byzantine forces during the battle in the Tryavna Pass is the archaeologist Ivan Yordanov. He pays special attention to the coin finds, which serve as significant landmarks for the movement of the army.

These coins belong to the Komnenos dynasty and include issues from the reigns of John II Komnenos (1118–1143), Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180), and Andronikos I Komnenos (1182–1185).

Additionally, coins from the early years of the reign of Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195) have also been discovered, allowing for an approximate dating of the events and tracing the path of the Byzantine forces.

The Tryavna Pass, also known as Krysaki, represents an important mountain corridor used since the Roman era and throughout the Middle Ages. This pass served as a significant communication route connecting different parts of the Balkan Peninsula.

The main road, called by the locals the Great Road or the Tsar’s Road, linked the ancient city of Novae near Svishtov with Augusta Traiana, present-day Stara Zagora. It passed along mountain ridges through numerous locations, including Sechen Kamak, Mount Mukhchenitsa with an elevation of 1,157 meters, the area of Pryaslata, Mount Golyam Bedek (1,288 meters), Mount Bulgarka (1,445 meters), Cherni Vrah (779 meters), and Krun. This road was not only used in the past but remains passable to this day, which attests to its strategic and transport significance over the centuries.

The chronicler Nicetas Choniates, who provides a detailed account of the events during the reign of Emperor Alexios II Komnenos, offers valuable information about the movement of the Byzantine army prior to the battle in the Tryavna Pass. According to his reports, Emperor Alexios II Komnenos personally commanded his troops, but during the course of the campaign he led them into "dead-end and difficult-to-pass places and narrow mountain paths." This strategic error had a decisive impact on the outcome of the battle, as the impassable terrain hindered maneuvers and exposed the army to the danger of ambush and encirclement.

The Byzantine army did not use the better-known and easier Beroe road, but instead chose a route passing from Tryavna through Plachkovtsi to the area known as Pryaslata. This choice of path is of key importance, as it was precisely in this area that the events leading to the defeat of the Byzantine forces unfolded. In 1986, the local historian Kanche Penchev conducted a terrain survey along this route, which contributed to a better understanding of the historical events. He had already, at a scientific conference in 1985 dedicated to the 800th anniversary of the Asenid uprising, defended the hypothesis that it was in the defile of the Semaniska River (also known as the Yovovska) that the Byzantine army was routed.

The road leading to the settlement of Kăsovtsi passes through open terrain of strategic significance. In this open section of the route, the Byzantine army could neither be surprised nor encircled, as the terrain allowed for free observation and maneuvering. Nevertheless, after passing Kăsovtsi, the road enters a narrow gorge through which the Yovovska River flows. This narrow passage represents a critical section, as on both sides rise rocky and stony ridges that restrict movement and create conditions favorable for an ambush.

Nicetas Choniates reports that the Byzantine army "suffered greatly from the rolling stones" in this area, which suggests that the Bulgarian forces used the terrain to their advantage by triggering rockslides or throwing stones from the ridges onto the enemy. This tactical action was made possible by the unique combination of three topographical and hydrographical elements – a narrow pass, a stream, and stone-covered ridges – which are not found anywhere else in the pass. This combination of natural features leaves no doubt as to the exact location of the Byzantine army’s defeat, which is of exceptional importance for historical scholarship and for understanding the course of the battle in the Tryavna Pass.

In the battle in the Tryavna Pass, the Bulgarian forces, led by Tsar Asen I, executed an exceptionally effective maneuver, which was described in detail by the Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates. He explains that the autocrat, that is, the Byzantine emperor, advanced deep into a difficult and inaccessible place, which turned out to be a trap with no escape. This strategic positioning of the terrain allowed the Bulgarians to organize an ambush and encircle the Roman (Byzantine) army with surprise and relentless pursuit.

The Bulgarian army moved along the Beroe road and chose as the site of the ambush the junction of the road along the Yovovska River with the main road. At this moment, according to the information of Theodore Skutariotes, the Bulgarian forces were still gathering, which shows that the attack was sudden and well coordinated. The barbarians, as Nicetas Choniates calls them, attacked with a large number of kreasci—heavily armed fighters who exerted serious pressure on the Roman infantry.

The Byzantine infantry, although facing difficult circumstances, did not show negligence. It strove not to be encircled and undertook an ascent of the steep slopes of the place to hold back the barbarians descending from the ridge. This tactic was difficult and dangerous, but the infantry managed to temporarily resist the attackers. Nevertheless, the multitude of barbarians gradually overcame the Romans, who suffered heavily from the rolling stones thrown at them from the higher positions.

The Roman army retreated gradually, but not too quickly and not on a large scale, which shows that they tried to maintain their order. However, the foreigners—the Bulgarians and their allies—continued to gain the upper hand. They exerted their strength and massively attacked the Roman ranks, which led to the Byzantines being thrown into disorder. Chaos followed among the army, with everyone striving to save themselves, and discipline and organization were completely broken.

The enemies showed no mercy to the captured. They tortured them like animals confined in a pen and killed all who fell into their hands. None of the Romans defended themselves or could defend themselves, which speaks of their complete defeat and the despair in their ranks. The emperor barely managed to escape, breaking through the encirclement with great effort, but in his escape he lost his helmet, which is a sign of the dire situation he was in.

The encirclement of the Byzantine army was complete and achieved by surprise, thanks to the persistent pursuit by the Bulgarians. This victory was especially significant, as before that the siege of Tarnovo had been lifted, which suggests that the Bulgarian army not only defended its capital but also managed to inflict heavy defeats on the enemy in the field. The maneuver and tactics applied by Tsar Asen I and his forces demonstrate high military skill and determination in the struggle for Bulgaria’s independence and territorial integrity.

The Byzantine troops were marching in a column formation during the attack, which took place in the narrow and steep Tryavna Pass. This pass constituted a natural defile approximately 8–9 kilometers long, corresponding roughly to the entire length of the army's column. Due to the narrowness of the path, the soldiers were arranged three abreast, a formation imposed by the geographical features of the terrain, which limited the possibility of quickly changing battle order in the event of a sudden attack.

In the battle at the Tryavna Pass, many from the Roman (Byzantine) army fell, and those who survived along with the emperor were very few, which clearly indicates the severity of the defeat for Byzantium. Emperor Isaac II Angelos, although he escaped, managed to reach Constantinople, but the loss of the main forces was catastrophic for the Roman side.

After the rout, the Bulgarian tribe grew significantly proud, filled with pride from the achieved victory. The Bulgarians not only won the battle but also seized a large booty from the Roman troops, including the more valuable imperial insignia, which had great symbolic and moral significance. Among the spoils were the emperor’s pyramidal crown, the cups of noble magnates, numerous coins, and even the imperial cross, which emphasized the heavy blow to Byzantine authority and prestige.

The sebastokrator Doukas, who commanded the troops of the rear guard, realized that the main Roman forces had fallen into an ambush, but instead of rushing to help, he hurried to withdraw from the site of the disaster. He probably chose to retreat through the Dabovski Pass, where near the village of Dabovo [in the Balkan range] 38 copper coins of Emperor Isaac II Angelos were found, which testifies to the movement of the troops in this area.

The joining of the vanguard with the rear guard probably took place near Beroea, from where the Roman troops headed towards Constantinople, trying to recover after the heavy defeat. At the same time, the Bulgarian troops demonstrated great military skill in the destruction of the Byzantine army, as after a persistent pursuit they managed to encircle the enemy by surprise in a well-chosen locality, unfavorable for the Roman forces.

The encirclement and the subsequent destruction of the enemy were the result of a strategic and tactical maneuver that the Bulgarians had already used earlier – this is the second use of this tactic after the victory at Trajan’s Gate in 986 AD. In both cases, the Bulgarians bypassed the vanguard and attacked the main enemy forces, which shows the traditional character of this strategy and its effective application.

After the great victory, the Bulgarian troops went on the offensive on a broad front, and according to the Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates, the Bulgarians had superiority over the Romans. He quotes: “And so the authorities (the Bulgarians), emboldened by their constant victories over the Romans and having acquired splendid riches and all kinds of weapons from the Roman booty, became unstoppable in their attacks.”

This confidence and strength of the Bulgarians were also reflected in the change of their military actions – they no longer attacked or devastated only villages and rural estates, but directed their weapons against cities fortified with large towers. This means that after the battle at the Tryavna Pass, the Bulgarians moved to more ambitious and decisive military actions aimed at expanding their influence and territories through the conquest of more significant and fortified sites.

In 1190, the Bulgarian forces began an offensive against the coastal fortresses of Varna and Anchialos, which is today called Pomorie. These cities held strategic importance for controlling the Black Sea coastline and securing Bulgarian communications. After fierce battles, the Bulgarians succeeded in capturing both fortresses, which brought them significant military advantage and the opportunity to expand their influence in this region.

In the period following the battle in the Tryavna Pass, the Bulgarian troops undertook active military operations against the Byzantine possessions, with their main targets being the cities of Plovdiv and Beroea, present-day Stara Zagora. These attacks were part of the Bulgarians' strategy to weaken Byzantine authority in the region and to expand their influence. Despite the determination of the Bulgarians, their assaults on Plovdiv and Beroea were repelled by Byzantine forces, which temporarily bolstered the confidence of the Roman emperor and his army.

The repulsion of the Bulgarian attacks gave the emperor confidence, but at the same time, an internal conflict flared up in Byzantium, described as a rebellion against the emperor himself. This revolt, likely caused by dissatisfaction among the high aristocracy or military circles, ended with the capture and blinding of the emperor. This dramatic turn in the political situation in Byzantium created a serious power vacuum and weakened central authority, which the Bulgarians skillfully exploited.

Taking advantage of the internal discord in Byzantium, the Bulgarians renewed their attacks along a broad front, with their assaults following one after another without respite for the Roman troops. This continuous military activity placed serious pressure on the Byzantine garrisons and tore apart the possibilities for effective defense. Among the major cities targeted by the Bulgarian military actions were Serdica (present-day Sofia), Plovdiv, Adrianople (Odrin), and other important centers that were key to controlling the Balkans.

In 1194, near Arcadiopolis, present-day Lüleburgaz, a major battle took place between the Bulgarian forces and the Roman troops. This battle involved troops from both the Asian possessions of the Byzantine Empire and its European territories. The eastern Roman detachments were commanded by the general Guido Aleksi, while the western detachments were led by Basil Vatatzes. Despite the combined efforts of the two commanders, the Roman troops failed to achieve a favorable outcome in the battle.

The battle ended in a heavy defeat for the Byzantines. Guido Aleksi, leading the eastern detachments, fled in disorder, which further demoralized the army. The best part of his forces perished in the fight, and Basil Vatatzes and his detachments were also routed. This failure of the Byzantine army undermined the military power of the empire and gave the Bulgarians the advantage in the region.

After the defeat at Arcadiopolis, the emperor decided to personally take command of the troops against the Bulgarians, demonstrating the seriousness of the situation and the need for decisive action. For this purpose, additional recruitment of soldiers was carried out, and funds were secured to pay their wages, which was crucial for maintaining discipline and motivation in the army.

Byzantine diplomacy also became active—envoys were sent to the Hungarian king Béla III with a request for military assistance. King Béla III promised to send troops in support of the Byzantines, which could have shifted the balance of power in the region.

In March 1195, Emperor Isaac II Angelos left the capital of the Byzantine Empire and arrived at Kipsela, present-day Ipsala, likely with the intention to personally organize the defense and coordinate military actions against the Bulgarians. However, he became the victim of a conspiracy led by his brother Alexios. As a result of this conspiracy, Isaac II Angelos was blinded, which ended his rule and further destabilized Byzantium at a critical moment in the war with Bulgaria.

After Alexios III Angelos ascended the Byzantine throne in 1195, he focused his attention mainly on the administration and defense of his holdings in Asia Minor, leaving the western borders of the empire more lightly guarded. During this period, the Bulgarians, led by Tsar Ivan Asen I, began active military operations against Byzantium in the same year. They undertook a bold and well-planned campaign, descending through the valley of the Struma River, which allowed them to penetrate deeply into the territories of the Romans and inflict significant defeats on the Byzantine forces.